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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
  The CIA’s Global Trend 2015 study (2005) anticipates that the United Nations (UN) 
and regional and sub-regional organizations will continue to be called upon to manage 
conflicts around the world because major states—stressed by domestic concerns, perceived 
risk of failure, lack of political will, or tight resources—will wish to minimize their direct 
involvement.  
  As conflicts and subsequent operations have become increasingly complex during 
the post-Cold War era, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a single organization to address 
them alone (GAO 2005 Report). Hence many of the tasks of modern peace operations 
require the collaboration and cooperation of many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
(Benner et al. 2011; Pearson et al. 2013)—international organizations that meet regularly, 
formed by treaty, and have three or more states as members (Pevehouse et al. 2003).12   
  For the vast majority of peace operations the UN has remained to be the executive 
agency (Morrison and Blair 1999). Even though in the formative years of the UN, regional 
organizations and arrangements were viewed as “detrimental to the universal approach 
embodied in the organization” (Alagappa 1999, 270; Claude 1964; Barnett 1995), now it is 
widely accepted that regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations should 
collectively contribute to the provision of international peace and security (Alagappa 1999; 
Boulden 2003; S/RES/1631 2005). 
  When Post-Cold War euphoria has waned with the rise of ethnic, sectarian and 
internal armed conflicts, the UN found itself operating in complex environments in which its 
“traditional adherence to the principle of non-use of force, except in self-defense, effectively 
                                                
1 This study only includes IGOs that have a bearing on issues of peace and war. More 
specifically, similar to Bjurner and Wallersteen’s (2015) classification, the focus remains on 
2 The list of IGOs examined in this study is provided in Appendix. 
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left both blue helmets and local civilians at risk” (Benner et al. 2011, 14). These “new wars” 
(Kaldor 1999), required more nuanced ways of using force, and thus, new instruments, 
capacities, and capabilities, and a new “doctrine for military and police forces as well as new 
ways of information sharing and analysis” (Benner et al. 2011, 14). In order to share the 
burden of these complex missions, in a coordinated manner, the UN developed “a process of 
multilateral dialogue in the attempt to move from an ad hoc relationship to an organized and 
systematic collaboration under Chapter VIII of the Charter” (Felicio 2009, 16).3 
  A notable feature of the post-Cold War era with regard to peace operations, therefore, 
has been the vitalization of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and delegation of peace 
operations’ tasks to regional organizations and arrangements (Bjurner and Wallensteen 
2015). Regional and sub-regional organizations have been asked to step in and address 
security challenges and respond to perceived threats to international peace and security, 
involving mass atrocities, human tragedies and crimes against civilians committed by both 
state and non-state actors (Gelot 2012).  
  On the one hand, since regional and sub-regional organizations can be better 
positioned to provide early warning and monitor peace agreements, they became particularly 
crucial partners in addressing these new security challenges and threats (Felicio 2009). On 
the other hand, reluctance of the international community to commit resources (Boulden 
2003) and intervene, as was the case in Rwanda, and detachment of the UN, particularly 
with regard to the African conflicts (Gelot 2012), compelled regional and sub-regional IGOs 
                                                
3 Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter lays out the foundation for regional organizations 
or arrangements to settle disputes before submitting to the UN Security Council. Yet, though 
these organizations may use enforcement action, such action cannot be “taken…without the 
authorization of the Security Council, without the exception of measures against any enemy 
state” (Chapter VIII, Article 53). Even though this article (Article 53) appears to establish a 
hierarchical relationship between regional (which is used as an umbrella term for sub-
regional and extra-regional organizations) and the UN, this study treats them as equal 
entities. 
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to commit themselves to “the notion of home-grown solutions” (Babarinde 2011, 275), thus, 
to partner with other regional and sub-regional IGOs as well as to engage in peace 
operations alongside the UN (Sidhu 2006) forming networks of relationships.  
  This dissertation examines these partnerships and collaborative efforts among IGOs 
applying a network analysis perspective. The study focuses on then these inter-
organizational networks—sets of organizations related through exchange relations or 
affiliations (Jones and Van de Ven 2013), whether formally structured through time or ad hoc 
in each conflict, including strategic alliances, collaboration and joint ventures (Brass et al. 
2004)—the networking patterns among IGOs in peace operations and the effect of the 
structure of inter-organizational networks on success/failure of missions in implementing 
their core goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and settlement. 
  The increasing number and volume of partnerships and collaborations among IGOs 
in peace operations makes this topic particularly important. Notwithstanding the growing 
consensus on the benefits associated with collaborations among IGOs in peace operations 
(Boulden 2003; Francis 2006; Holt and Shanahan 2005; Artihano 2012), academic research 
thus far has neglected pressing questions of why IGOs form partnerships with one another, 
how they collaborate within a network context in peace missions and how these collaboration 
networks might account for the success/failure of peace operations.  
  This study addresses two specific questions. First, what are the factors that 
determine the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs, 
and the patterns of collaboration, i.e., the complimentary or parallel roles played by the 
collaborating IGOs in peace operations? Second, how do the structure and composition of 
these IGO networks in peace operations account for the success/failure of missions?  
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  By confronting these questions, this study seeks to help us to gain a better 
understanding of peace operations, collaborations among IGOs engaged in these missions, 
and their effect on peace operations’ outcomes. And thus, it addresses a significant lacuna in 
the theoretical and empirical research on peace operations’ performance.  
  This introduction chapter proceeds as follows: First, I discuss the importance of the 
research question and this study’s theoretical and empirical contributions to organizational 
studies and peace operations literature. Second, I provide an overview of the methods and 
datasets this study utilizes. Next, I introduce the taxonomy of peace operations used in this 
study. Then, I outline the contending theories and perspectives on the definition of the 
success and failure in peace operations. Last, I conclude by providing an outline of the 
chapters of this dissertation.  
Statement of the Research Problem 
  Since the inception of UN peace-related operations in Palestine in 1948, peace 
operations have gone through substantive changes (Spieker 2000). While the end of bipolar 
world, and the improvement in West-East relations introduced new possibilities for 
addressing common security threats, social peace remained to be “challenged on the one 
hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of 
terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means” (An 
Agenda for Peace, para.11). 
  Due to a continually changing global environment, peace operations have evolved as 
well into an increasingly comprehensive and complex response by the “international 
community” (Morrison and Blair 1999; Brahimi Report 2000). Realizing that restoring 
enduring peace required more than “just ending overt fighting” (Durch and Berkman 2006, 
11), in the late 1990s the UN took new responsibilities and tasks such as state and institution 
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building, peacebuilding missions, and wider range of peacekeeping, including policing, and 
robust peace enforcement (Kemp et al. 2013). These developments paved the way for 
further institutionalization within the UN, such as the establishment of the Office of the Rule 
of Law and Security Institutions and the Department of Field Support in the UN Department 
for Peacekeeping Operations (Kemp et al. 2013), and compelled the organization to seek out 
support from regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations, and thus, to become 
more effective in tapping outside sources of expertise and resources. 
  During that period, IGOs have begun to regularly meet, on the working level almost 
on a daily basis, and to coordinate a wide range of issues with regard to crises management. 
For instance, even though a stable cooperation among the UN, EU, and NATO was difficult 
during the Cold War due to ideological confrontations among member states, since the end 
of Cold War we have witnessed an increasing interaction among those organizations. 
Particularly in early 2000s, “the EU has managed to establish close inter-organizational links 
and coordination mechanisms with both NATO and the UN” (Koops 2008, 28).  
  The EU, in close cooperation with the UN, has conducted civil-military management 
operations, i.e., the EU police mission in Bosnia, military mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (Koops 2008), and military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Eastern Chad 
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA EEAS). Moreover, under the so-called the “Berlin Plus Agreement,” the 
EU and NATO have launched two integrated missions in Bosnia and Macedonia.  
  In peace operations stakes are very high. If done well, peace operations can stop or 
prevent recurrent violence, protect civilians from harm, and expedite the implementation of 
peace agreements. Failures, crimes and abuses hurt people, impair the legitimacy of peace 
operations, and curtail the likelihood of stable peace. As peace operations have become 
more complex “in terms of both the actors who conduct and authorize them and the tasks 
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they perform,” (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 3), it has become particularly critical to study, 
analyze, and understand concepts, theories, histories, work of international bureaucracies in 
the field, and future challenges of peace operations (Bellamy and Williams 2010). 
  Even though collaborations among IGOs in peace operations have become common 
and viewed as crucial, even indispensable, the conditions and outcomes of inter-
organizational collaborations, networking, have remained understudied. Although prior 
studies (Biermann 2008; Balas 2011a; Balas 2011b) dealt with the questions as what factors 
determine cooperation between IGOs in the context of peace operations, they did not explain 
the possible relationship between patterns and structure of inter-organizational 
collaborations—analyzed in a network context—in peace operations and effectiveness of 
these missions, nor did they distinguish between the effects of various structures on 
interrelationships. 
  Networks are highly complex as compared to other forms of inter-organizational 
interactions, e.g., hierarchies and markets, and are composed of various configurations—
patterns, which emerge time and again in network formation processes: dyads, triads, 
organization-sets, and action-sets (Biermann 2008). Different from prior studies on inter-
organizational networks in peace operations (Yost 2007; Biermann 2008), which only 
focused on the dyadic level (micro level) interactions between organizations (Balas 2011a; 
Balas 2011b), this study seeks to explain the micro level as well as the macro-level 
interactions among IGOs: organizational aggregates and their autonomous effects. In other 
words, I examine not only dyads of IGOs, but also triads, and entire networks of IGOs in 
peace operations and the conditions that make for varied forms of networking and the effect 
of these configurations and the network structure on success/failure of peace operations.  
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  This study seeks to bring inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs in 
conducting peace operations to the forefront and evaluate their role and the extent of their 
contribution to the peace operations’ performance in undertaking their core goals. This study 
moves beyond discussions on success/failure of peace operations that revolve around a 
number case studies to a deeper, and more systematic understanding of the theoretical 
issues involved in forming and maintaining collaborative alliances, and the outcomes of 
these collaborative efforts in the conduct of peace missions. More specifically, this study 
offers a comprehensive analysis of preconditions and processes of inter-organizational 
collaborations among IGOs in peace operations and how these collaborative efforts account 
for the success and failure of such missions. 
Theoretical and Empirical Contributions  
  This dissertation offers several empirical and theoretical contributions. Adopting a 
network perspective, this dissertation is the first study that longitudinally investigates the 
formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace 
missions. In that sense, this study enlarges the literature on intergovernmental organizations 
and their collaborations.  
  As noted earlier in the chapter, though collaborative relations have been increasing 
across the IGOs conducting peace operations, we still do not know what are the factors that 
enhance the formation of these collaborative efforts in peace operations. This dissertation 
applies a multi-theoretical multi-level (MTML) framework (Noshir et al. 2006) to analyze the 
factors that initiate these collaborative relations. Since there is no dominant theory that fully 
explains why and how organizations collaborate, MTML framework is useful to explain IGO 
collaborations across multiple theories and levels to gain a “more complete picture of the 
design and operation” (Sowa 2009, 1005) of these collaborative efforts.  
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  This study also engages in a comparison of the rhetoric used by IGOs with regard to 
their collaborative efforts and the actual experience on the ground (Boulden 2013). While 
many scholars (Balas 2011a; Bellamy and Williams 2013) point out the importance of 
collaborative efforts among IGOs, there is no research that explores and assesses these 
collaborations’ effect in peace operations’ outcomes. Thus peace operations literature is in 
need of scholarship that offers both theoretical and empirical insights on how collaborations 
among IGOs affect the performance peace missions. This study seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature on peace operations by analyzing the link between peace operations effectiveness 
and inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs.  
  By using network specific measures, such as centralization and density, this 
dissertation assesses the role of IGO networks in peace operations outcomes, and provides 
a framework to interpret how IGO networks’ structure and composition affect how peace 
missions perform in implementing their core goals.  
  This study furthermore contributes to the literature on peace operations by providing 
a systematic analysis of the success and failure of peace operations based on the Diehl-
Druckman Evaluation Criteria 4  across a large number of peace operations. While this 
framework is widely used among scholars to judge the performance of peace operations 
(Whalan 2012; Braithwaite 2012; Druckman and Diehl 2010; Bellamy and Williams 2013), 
the existing literature prominently focuses on single country/conflict case studies. However, 
as Boulden (2013) points out, this approach leads to concerns over generalizability with 
regard to the extent which these case studies can afford a solid enough foundation for useful 
comparisons. By analyzing collective successes of all peace missions deployed in internal 
armed conflicts between 1990-2013 and employing the Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria, 
                                                
4 A detailed explanation of the Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria is provided in Chapter 5.  
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this study sets a foundation for predicting how the structure and composition of inter-
organizational networks play out in relation to the success and failure of peace operations in 
accomplishing their core goals. 
  This study also incorporates three illustrative cases in addition to statistical analyses. 
In that sense, this dissertation makes a stand alone contribution to the case study literature 
(Boulden 2013) associated with peace operations as these are the first case studies 
(regarding the countries under study) that illustrate the possible link between the success of 
peace missions and collaborative efforts among the IGOs operating in these conflicts. 
  As a whole this project seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature on peace operations 
by exploring IGO collaborations’ impact on the conduct and performance of peace mission. 
Analyzing and comparing the role of inter-organizational interactions in conducting peace 
operations will broaden studies on organizational learning and practices by providing insights 
on which types of IGO networks and collaborations perform better than others, and why. 
Consequently, this may allow for the design and conduct of more effective missions and 
provide an impetus for repeating these best practices in future operations. 
Methods and Dataset  
  Analyses of this study rely on two new datasets: 1) Collaborations among IGOs, 2) 
IGO Networks in Peace Operations.  
  The dataset on the formation and evolution of IGO collaborations is drawn from the 
Dyadic Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations Dataset compiled by Balas (2011b), 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations 
Database, IGO reports and briefings.5  
                                                
5 A more detailed explanation of this dataset is provided in Chapter 3. 
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  To investigate the factors that drive the formation and evolution of peace operations, I 
employ social network analysis, more specifically the Temporal Exponential Random Graph 
Models (TERGM).6 Drawing on Collaborations among IGOs dataset, I construct matrices—
for each year under study—that illustrate the absence and presence of collaborations 
between IGO dyads included in the dataset. Additionally, a matrix of IGO characteristics, 
such as the region in which IGOs are headquartered, their organizational function, resource 
level capacity and type, is built and included in the model.  
  The second dataset, IGO Networks in Peace Operations, constitutes characteristics 
of IGO networks, e.g., centralization and density, engaged in peace missions in internal 
armed conflicts during the time period under study as well as the conflict and host country 
characteristics. This dataset relies on a variety of data sources that are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5. Drawing on this data, I use logistic regression with cubic splines to account for 
the temporal dependence in my models. Further discussion regarding this specific method is 
provided in Chapter 5 as well. 
  In addition to quantitative analyses, I use illustrative cases to assess my findings with 
regard to the relationship between IGO networks’ composition and structure, and peace 
operations’ performance in implementing their core goals, i.e., violence abatement, conflict 
containment and conflict settlement. The first case examines the role of collaborations 
among AU, ECOWAS, and the UN in operations’ success in dampening the violence in Cote 
d’Ivoire. The second case explores how collaborative efforts by the NATO, UN, OSCE and 
EU have helped to contain the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. The last case, Sudan:Darfur, highlights the effect of collaborations among 
IGAD, AU, UN, and the Arab League on conflict settlement success.  
                                                
6 A detailed overview of this model is provided in Chapter 3.  
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Some Conceptual Issues  
What are Peace Operations? 
  Peacekeeping has never been defined in the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the 
second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld “improvised the 
practice in response to the Suez Crisis with the creation of the First United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF I), and later Secretaries-General the UN have followed in his 
footsteps by adapting peacekeeping on the fly to meet new international challenges” (Levine 
2014, 6). 
  Notwithstanding their absence in the UN Charter, the UN peacekeeping operations 
derive their legal standing from Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. While Chapter VI, “The 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” grants the UN Security Council and the General Assembly 
the authority to take the necessary steps to settle the disputes, Chapter VII gives the 
Security Council the authority to take measures necessary to restore “international peace 
and security” (Charter of the United Nations). 
  However the notion of peace operations goes beyond merely peacekeeping, and is a 
broader concept. Peacekeeping was originally to be the use of neutral forces to separate 
warring parties and prevent the recurrent of fighting, what came to be termed “preventive 
diplomacy.” 
  This dissertation uses the Bellamy and Williams’s taxonomy to define peace 
operations. Bellamy and Williams (2005) define peace operations as the expeditionary use of 
uniformed personnel, such as police, troops, military experts and observers. Peace 
operations based on this criterion should have an explicit mandate to “assist in the 
prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to 
observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or enforce 
  
 
   
12 
ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable 
peace” (Bellamy and Williams 2005, 14). 
  More specifically, peace operations refer to peace missions, e.g., preventive 
deployments, traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting 
transitions, transitional administrations, and peace support operations (Bellamy et al. 2010), 
carried out by troops in operations by IGOs (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Based on this 
taxonomy, in preventive deployments, peacekeepers are deployed in order to prevent a 
probable conflict. For instance, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 
(UNPREDEP)—the first mission in the history of UN peacekeeping to have a preventive 
mandate—was established in Macedonia in 1995 to prevent the disputes before they morph 
into serious conflicts. 
  Traditional peacekeeping operations intend to facilitate the negotiation of a political 
settlement; in these types of operations, traditional peacekeepers work with the belligerents 
and do not enforce any particular solution. Wider peacekeeping operations facilitate the 
deployment of traditional peacekeeping missions and assist transitions. These operations 
fulfill the aims of traditional peacekeeping along with other tasks, such as providing 
humanitarian relief. Peace enforcement, sometimes characterized as “robust peacekeeping” 
(Nsia-Pepra 2011; 2014) deployments command the will of the United Nations Security 
Council to the conflicting parties. In some conflict situations, such as the presence of 
spoilers, or militias that threaten peacekeepers or civilian population, the Security Council 
has granted UN peacekeeping operations “robust mandates” (DPKO Capstone Doctrine 
2008). Thus robust and traditional peacekeeping might require different types of inter-
organizational collaboration; as for example peace enforcement might entail the need for 
more supplies and troop reinforcements. 
  
 
   
13 
  Robust mandates authorize peacekeeping operations to “use all necessary means” to 
defend the mission and provide the security of peacekeepers (Coning et al. 2008). Even 
though the line between peace enforcement and “robust” peacekeeping might blur at times, 
important differences exist between these two missions. For instance, “while robust 
peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host 
authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of 
force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States 
under Article (2) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council” (DPKO Capstone 
Doctrine 2008, 19). 
  By deploying police, military and civilian personnel, assisting transitions facilitate the 
implementation of political transition in the host country. Transitional administrations are 
deployed after the implementation of peace agreement, and can have the control of a 
particular territory or country, e.g., its economy, borders, the media. Furthermore, these 
administrations might run hospitals, schools as well as administer the judicial system. Lastly, 
peace support operations “aim to establish liberal democratic political systems and societies 
within the state” (Bellamy et al. 2010, 9). 
What is Success? Perspectives on Success and Failure 
  As Maley (2013) notes evaluating the success of peace operations is not a 
straightforward undertaking and “any endeavors in this area are complicated by a range of 
intellectual challenges that flow from the complexity of the subject matter” (Maley 2013, 1). 
One area of complexity can be attributed to the very meaning of word “success.” What do we 
mean by “success”? 
  Over the years a considerable amount of research (Druckman and Stern 1997; 
Stedman et al. 2002; Diehl 2008; MacQueen 2008; Lijn 2009; Bellamy et al. 2010) has 
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documented the outcomes of peace operations—success and failure. Even though a variety 
of scholarly “cultures” has dealt with this debate, there is no consensus on how to define 
success, and the elements, factors, and practices that would lead to success or failure of a 
mission (MacQueen 2008). 
  The literature on success and failure of peace operations is dominated by three 
perspectives (MacQueen 2008). The scholars in the first school of thought, e.g., William 
Durch and Paul Diehl, mainly concentrate on the means and ends of the missions. That is to 
say, first, they focus on whether a mission was able to stop the violence and contribute to the 
process of peace making. Second, they note that the mandate of a mission, and willingness 
on the part of the UN members have critical importance in affecting performance of peace 
operations (MacQueen 2008). 
  Bellamy and Williams (2005) concede that using the same criteria to judge the 
success and failure of different types of operations would be disingenuous since each 
operation aims to accomplish different objectives. Yet by evaluating a mission based on how 
well it accomplishes its mandate, this problem can be overcome (Bellamy and Williams 
2005). However, some scholars (Diehl 1994; Findlay 2002; Diehl 2008) also note that 
although a mission’s mandate is seen as an important factor in accounting for success and 
failure of the peace operation, using mandate alone to assess a mission’s success/failure is 
problematic. Because “mandates are a product of political deliberation and compromise” 
(Diehl 2008, 123), often they are vague, and inconsistent (Boucher 2010); hence it is difficult 
to determine whether objectives of the mandate have been attained. Furthermore, mandates 
might be inflexible in that they cannot address the changing conditions on the ground 
(Ozerdem 2006; Diehl 2008); therefore “what peacekeepers are attempting to do may no 
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longer reflect the standards present in the mandate” (Diehl 2008, 123) and might thereby 
lead to the judgment that operation failed. 
  Effective peace operations, Durch and Berkman (2006) suggest, do not have to be 
“solving everyone’s problems for all time but they do require that underlying grievances be 
resolved or successfully shifted into non-violent channels for resolution. When these tasks 
are accomplished, complex operations can end gracefully, even when many other local 
problems remain” (Durch and Berkman 2006, 100). 
  The second school of thought assesses the outcomes of missions from a broader 
perspective. Although they do not rule out the importance of achieving the mission’s 
mandate as an element of success, analysts and scholars in this school of thought argue 
that the most important contribution that a peace operation can make is to achieve a 
permanent peace in the broadest sense. Therefore, they assert that in order for a mission to 
be viewed as successful, it must contribute to an economic equality and harmonious 
relations within or between societies (MacQueen 2008). 
  The last perspective judges the effect of a mission from regional and global 
perspective. Success, the scholars in that third school of thought suggest, “can be judged by 
the extent to which the peacekeeping instrument lubricated the machinery of the state-based 
international system” (MacQueen 2008, 3). Similarly, for Lijn (2009) in order to qualify as a 
success, the peace operation should contribute to the establishment of ten years of negative 
peace and “a positive development in remedying the causes of the conflict” (Lijn 2009, 46). 
  As noted above, scholars disagree on how to evaluate the impact of peace 
operations. To illustrate, according to Diehl and Druckman (2010) and Ratner (1995), 
scholars should employ quantitative analysis to measure the implications of operations. 
Lastly, though peace operations have different mandates, they do share common goals. 
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While these peace operation goals are mostly associated with traditional peacekeeping 
operations, “virtually all peace operations seek to achieve violent abatement, conflict 
containment and conflict settlement” (Diehl and Druckman 2013, 16). Therefore, rather than 
examining peace operations outcomes based on only one success criterion, employing the 
Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria, I assess the success of peace operations with regard to 
the core goals they try to implement, i.e., conflict abatement, conflict containment and 
conflict settlement. Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of the Diehl-Druckman 
Evaluation Criteria this study employs.  
Conclusion  
  This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) develops a 
theoretical perspective to discuss the factors that drive the formation and evolution of inter-
organizational collaborations among IGOs in undertaking peace operations’ tasks. The 
second part (Chapters 4 and 5) explores the impact of these collaborative efforts, which are 
examined in a network context, on the performance of peace operations, more specifically 
the success and failure of peace operations in abating violence, containing and settling 
conflicts in internal armed conflicts.  
  Even though the role of nation states and unilateral interventions are touched upon, 
the focus of this study remains IGOs, inter-organizational interactions, and the joint impact of 
these collaborative efforts on the success or failure of peace missions. Furthermore, this 
dissertation is not a study on the sources of conflict or civil wars. Though the background of 
conflicts are briefly discussed particularly in illustrative cases part, the discussion focuses on 
the period leading up to the deployments by IGOs and thereafter.  
Outline of the Dissertation  
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  Chapter 1 outlines the trends in peace operations, and inter-organizational 
collaborations among IGOs in such missions, followed by the introduction of the research 
statement. It provides definitions of peace operations based on the Bellamy-Williams 
taxonomy and introduces the perspectives on peace operations’ success.  
  Chapter 2 discusses the theory on inter-organizational collaboration. It addresses the 
questions such as: What are the factors that may determine the formation and evolution of 
collaborative relations and partnerships between IGOs in conducting peace operations?  
  Chapter 3 introduces research design, and discusses a class of network statistical 
models, Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs), and their extension to Temporal 
Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGMs). In this chapter, I present my results 
regarding the factors that determine IGOs to collaborate in peace operations.  
  Chapter 4 briefly surveys the academic literature on the success and failure of peace 
operations, and elaborates a theoretical framework to examine the impact of IGO networks’ 
structure and composition on outcomes of peace operations, more specifically, the success 
and failure of peace operations in implementing their core goals—violence abatement, 
conflict containment and conflict settlement—based on the Diehl-Druckman Evaluation 
Criteria.  
  Before analyzing the illustrative cases, Chapter 5 introduces research design and 
provides a discussion on the variables and findings regarding the relationship between IGO 
networks and peace operations’ performance in implementing their core goals. 
  Chapter 6 first summarizes the findings in relation to the key questions of this study: 
1) Why do IGOs collaborate in peace operations? 2) How do IGO networks account for the 
performance of peace operations? Then, it discusses theoretical, empirical and policy 
implications of my findings. Finally, it presents a research agenda for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 2 THEORY AND EMPIRICS IN THE STUDY OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL 
COLLABORATION 
 
Introduction 
  Inter-organizational collaboration among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in 
peace operations presents an interesting puzzle—IGOs often find themselves “pulled 
between two competing views of collaboration” (Thomson and Perry 2006, 20). One the one 
hand, extreme conditions, such as violence against civilians, humanitarian catastrophes, 
failed states, institutions, and economies, are difficult, even impossible for a single 
organization to deal with. On the other hand, “despite the popularity and benefits of inter-
organizational relationships, not all of the evidence is positive. Many inter-organizational 
relationships fall short of meeting the expectations of their participants or fail for other 
reasons” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, 368).  
         The main motive to participate in an inter-organizational network “primarily comes from 
an organization that has the opportunity to accomplish a goal that it otherwise would not be 
able to achieve on its own” (Lee et al. 2012, 551). Akin to interfirm collaborative linkages, 
cooperation among IGOs in peace operations can provide the benefit of resource sharing, 
which allows organizations to combine their experience, skills, physical, human and financial 
assets and knowledge, and thus, facilitate bringing together complementarity assets of 
participating IGOs (Richardson 1972).  
  Nevertheless, there are also costs associated with collaboration, such as loss of 
organizational identity, autonomy and image, as they have to pay attention to and 
accommodate collaborating IGOs’ demands (Thomson and Perry 2006; Balas 2011; Brosig 
and Motsamai 2014). Additionally, even though resource dependency and complementarities 
are among the major determinants for organizations to cooperate, collaboration can add 
financial burdens and complicate distribution of resources and tasks. Skepticism about 
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forging inter-organizational relations also derives from operational, administrative and 
political concerns that may lead to frictions and mistrust among partners. African Union (AU) 
cooperation with the United Nations (UN), for instance, have been problematic in the past 
owing to “debates over the role of the International Criminal Court in cases including Darfur 
and Libya” (Gowan and Sherman 2012, 2) and frictions reportedly have arisen at times over 
issues such as unequal compensation for those in the armed forces contingents (Boutellis 
and Williams 2013). 
  Further, the increased deployment of peace operations since the end of the Cold War 
led many scholars and practitioners to question whether regional arrangements and 
organizations might outweigh the UN’s role in peace missions and compete with the 
organization regarding mission personnel (Daniel 2008). Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the 
desire for autonomy inhibits the inter-organizational collaborative efforts. Harsch (2015), for 
instance, notes that the depth of UN-European Union (EU) cooperation was curbed during 
the early 2000s since European states sought “to avoid subordinating their personnel to UN 
command and control mechanisms” (Harsch 2015, 168). Furthermore, deployment of parallel 
operations in a single theater is regarded as highly inefficient since different chains of 
command and rules of engagement for each organization can hamper the collaborative 
efforts (Gowman and Sherman 2012). 
  In addition to problems associated inter-organizational cooperation in general, certain 
types of cooperation might be more likely to remain particularly sensitive (Gowan and 
Sherman, 2012) and further inhibit the initiation of collaborations. Rapid reaction forces, for 
example, have always been a point of controversy between IGOs in peace missions. Even 
though in theory well-equipped IGOs such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the EU would be able to deploy rapid reaction forces to assist less well-resourced regional 
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organizations, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, there is no 
guarantee that these reinforcements would always be available as given states’ political and 
military calculations to contribute to peacekeeping forces would be subject to change and 
uncertainty on case-by-case basis (Gowan and Sherman 2012). 
  Why then do IGOs cooperate despite the costs associated with inter-organizational 
collaboration? They collaborate since it is, for the most part, in their interest to do so, such as 
organization survival, having access to resources.7 Hence even though IGOs may compete 
for resources, influence, organizational autonomy and identity, they may benefit from 
“increased collaboration to enhance harmonization” (Fischer et al. 2012, 441) and 
coordination as multicultural, multinational, and complex peace operations occur in difficult 
security, humanitarian and economic environments that require effective collaborative efforts 
and coordination. Additionally, when the profit motive is removed from the calculation, as is 
the case in inter-organizational collaborations in peace operations, cooperation becomes 
more appealing as “the potential downsides of cooperation, such as reduced autonomy, 
shared resources, and increased dependence, are less likely to be seen as a threat to 
survival” (Provan and Milward 2001, 415). 
  Furthermore, the lack of logistical assets, and capabilities “which involve more than 
just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light infantry forces for 
peacekeeping” (The Challenges Project 2005, 18) compels organizations to turn to other 
IGOs that can offer these capacities. IGOs such as the EU, UN and NATO, as they are able 
to provide the required resources, therefore are often called upon to sustain a given mission. 
For instance, the UN has taken over the missions in Liberia in 2003, and Ivory Coast in 
                                                
7 Although IGOs do not have complete autonomy in their decision to collaborate as they are 
tasked to partner by decisions of their voting member states, they may develop the interests 
in collaboration once they are directed to collaborate.  
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2004, since regional powers and IGOs, such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), lacked the necessary resources to carry on these operations (Daniel 
2008). However, the reverse may hold as well. Extra-regional organizations, such as NATO, 
the EU or the UN may hand off missions to regional counterparts, as was the case in 
Burundi where the UN handed over the mission to an AU special task force (Bah and Jones 
2008), as regional organizations have greater cultural familiarity in the countries in which 
they are deployed and presumably enhance the legitimacy of the mission. 
  In addition, today’s multifunctional missions require complementary assets provided 
by different organizations to carry on effective missions. To illustrate, the UN Interim 
Administration Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) was divided into different pillars each of which 
was carried out by different IGOs. The UN, for instance, carried out Pillars One and Two of 
UNMIK, the civilian administration and humanitarian assistance, respectively. Pillar Three 
consisted of democratization and institution building was led by the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Finally, the EU led Pillar Four, which was in charge of 
economic reconstruction (Hansen et al. 2004). 
   In this chapter, I discuss the factors that might account for the formation of ties 
among IGOs in peace operations. Such ties, either in isolated cases or in on-going or 
repeated collaborations, constitute forms of social networks, or as such are amenable to 
methods of social network analysis. Drawing from communication, public administration, 
public management, organizational studies, and international relations, I apply a multi-
theoretical and multilevel (MTML) model to explain the emergence, evolution (e.g., 
manifested in the evolution of the IGO networks from that are sparse to those dense) and 
dissolution of inter-organizational collaborative networks among IGOs in peace operations, 
as well as the structure of these networks. I focus on theories of homophily, resource 
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dependency, collective action, social capital and alliance/coalition formation. However, 
before I detail a theoretical framework identifying the potential factors affecting the formation 
of these networks, I address how this study frames cooperation, collaboration and 
coordination. 
  While this and next chapter remain focused on the motives that would account for the 
emergence of IGO networks engaged in peace operations, Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the 
role of these networks in affecting the success and failure of peace missions. 
 Typology of Inter-Organizational Collaboration 
  The literature on inter-organizational collaboration (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; 
Thomson 2001) defines collaboration as an iterative and cyclical process that is executed in 
a reciprocal fashion. For Thomson (2011), collaboration represents a process that creates 
rules and norms through formal and informal negotiation and interaction. Collaboration, 
therefore, exhibits “a higher-order level of collective action than cooperation and 
coordination” (Thomson and Perry 2006, 23). Drawing on studies on inter-organizational 
collaboration, Thomson and Perry (2006) point out that cooperation and collaboration 
represent processes regarding the depth of integration, commitment and interaction, with 
“cooperation falling at the low end of the continuum and collaboration at the high end” 
(Thomson and Perry 2006, 23). Likewise for Gray (1989), collaboration is the end result of 
cooperation and coordination. In other words, collaboration manifests a longer process in 
which actors can explore their differences and consequently the ways to find common 
ground for addressing their problems (as cited in Thomson and Perry 2006). Thus 
collaboration in a sense implies a condition of greater comfort and familiarity among the 
participants than the more distant notions of cooperation or coordination. 
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  Nevertheless this study subsumes explanations and analyses of both cooperative 
and collaborative efforts among IGOs, as a peace mission in a given conflict might take 
place over years; still, within such missions, two or more IGOs might work together only for 
part of the time or for short periods. Therefore, both types of missions will be examined, i.e., 
those taking place for a short period of time—considered as a cooperative or coordinated 
relationship—and longer collaborations that might lead to the formation of norms, values, 
and common practices among organizations that launch the operations. 
  In peace operations, cooperation is the process of exploring possibilities in 
partnership with other intervening parties, i.e., IGOs, and pursuing a course of action to 
address the mission challenges. Collaborations tend to institutionalize and build upon those 
explorations. The principal thematic areas of cooperation and collaboration in such 
operations include: “operational concept development, detailed operational programming, 
conduct of operations, including specific operations related to: security; governance; 
institution building; rule of law (ROL); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); 
security sector reform (SSR); human rights; gender; refugee return and humanitarian 
assistance; information sharing; operational priority setting; resolution of inter-cultural 
conflicts; education and training; and the evaluation of progress” (The Challenges Project 
2005, 14).  
Inter-Organizational Networks and Theory  
  The expansive literature, drawn from business management, sociology, public 
administration and international relations, on inter-organizational networks addresses the 
questions such as where inter-organizational collaborations come from, and how they 
emerge (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), that is, identifying and explaining the factors that might 
drive the formation of collaborative networks (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). In organizational 
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studies, networking is regarded as “a strategic inter-organizational response to a globalized 
and increasingly dynamic, and complex business environment inhabited by more 
sophisticated consumers” (Henry et al. 2004, 842). Organizations, therefore, come together 
in a collaborative framework in networks in order to address dynamic and multidimensional 
problems, e.g., violent conflicts, disaster relief, and counter-terrorism. 
  Researchers adopting a network perspective to examine the motivation to collaborate 
rely on various theories to fully explain why organizations engage in collaborations and what 
they seek to obtain from these collaborations (Sowa 2009) as no single theory can fully 
explain this phenomenon. Thus scholars have developed useful frameworks for studying 
collaborations across multiple theories to acquire a more complete picture of the design and 
operation of collaborations (Sowa 2009). In conjunction with multiple theory framework, I 
apply the MTML model, with some modifications, to determine what factors foster the 
initiation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations in the conduct of peace 
operations. 
Social Network Theory and the Multi-Theoretical Multi-Level Model  
  Social network analysis detects and interprets patterns of social ties, e.g., formation 
of dyadic and triadic ties (Nooy et al. 2011, 5). Being different from markets and hierarchies, 
networks are seen as “agile” (Contractors et al. 2006, 681), and dynamic entities (Westby 
2012) that change as ties form, or disappear from the network (Everton 2012). 
  The network perspective can be applied to a variety of frameworks as well as actors. 
Actors—“nodes"—may be any social unit such as firms, collective entities, individuals, 
organizations, and divisions within organizations (Contractor et al. 2006). Relations among 
actors in social networks can be any kind of linkage, including affective expressions, such as 
friendships, workflows, social interactions, transfers of material or nonmaterial resources 
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(goods, expertise), formal role relations, and business alliances (Monge and Contractor 
2003). 
  Network analysis is an analytic technique which allows researchers to represent 
relational data, examine and explore the properties and the overall nature of these relations, 
and the interdependencies through these relations (Monge and Contractor 2003). As noted 
earlier, in networks relations are represented by ties or links, which are assigned properties 
in the network. Strength of ties, which shows the quantity or intensity of the relationships, 
can be either binary—the presence or absence of a relationship—or valued which indicates 
frequency and intensity of the link. Also relations in a network can be directed or undirected. 
Directed relations include the ones that the relation has an origin and a destination, as in 
communication networks (Lusher and Robins 2013). Nondirectional (undirectional) ties are 
those that do not have a direction. For instance, a relation that is “strategically allied with” is 
nondirectional since in this type of relationship, two individuals, firms, states, or organizations 
are tied without a direction or in a two-way relationship (Monge and Contractor 2003). 
  Networks are represented in two forms: matrices and graphs. Network data can be 
organized in square data matrices, which are also known as sociomatrices, in order to 
represent the data on interconnections of participants (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). 
Additionally, network data may be depicted via graphs in which lines and vectors connect the 
nodes.     
  Contractor et al. (2006) suggest that even though representing networks as graphs or 
matrices and measuring the properties of the network (e.g., centralization) are essential to 
diagnose network structure and patterns of network formation they only afford descriptive 
explanations. Therefore, the emergence of networks, for Monge and Contractor (2003), 
should be explained using an analytic framework, which “enables inferences to be made on 
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the basis of theories and statistical tests” (Monge and Contractor 2003, 45). Thus they 
introduce the MTML model, which is “an integrated theoretical and analytic framework that 
provides an appropriate basis for studying multiple substantive theories across several 
analytic levels on the basis of valid statistical inference techniques” (Monge and Contractor 
2003, 45). Put differently, the MTML framework is intended to relate various social theories 
with specific network properties and to develop theory-driven hypotheses in order to explain 
network formation, evolution, and dissolution (Monge and Contractor 2003). 
  The MTML perspective integrates and compares diverse theories and enhances the 
explanations of network evolution (Monge and Contractor 2001; Monge and Contractor 
2003) by distinguishing exogenous and endogenous variables that account for the probability 
of the absence or presence of ties between network actors (Monge and Contractor 2003; 
Contractor et al. 2006). Endogenous variables derive from structural tendencies hinged upon 
interdependencies within the networks (Atouba and Shumate 2010), whereas exogenous 
variables include actor attributes, such as similar or different organizational bureaucracies or 
capacities, as well as “properties of other relations among the network of nodes, and the 
same network of relations at previous points in time” (Monge and Contractor 2003, 61). In 
other words, exogenous variables are independent of, and external to, the network (Monge 
and Contractor 2003), though in a feedback loop network developments and ties may come 
to influence some of the exogenous factors over time, such as bureaucratic procedures or 
perceptions within the participating organizations or their sub-units. Lusher and Robins 
(2013) note that including both exogenous and endogenous explanations are important in 
making the right inferences about actor attributes and structural tendencies, such as 
formation of mutual ties at the dyadic level, and network centralization at the aggregate or 
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global level. By doing so, we do not underestimate (or overestimate) the importance of either 
organizational attributes or network structure. 
  As stated above, both endogenous and exogenous variables might account for 
network configurations. Variables that are endogenous to the network “capture the extent to 
which relational properties of the network influence its self-organization” (Contractor et al. 
2006, 686) and indicate whether “the configuration of ties in the observed realization reflects 
an underlying structural tendency that is consistent with the hypothesized network property” 
(Contractor et al. 2006, 686). A “network theory” presumes that the structure of the inter-
organizational collaboration network is an intrinsic element. That is to say, the structure of 
the network affects the actions of the network actors and the actions of actors affect the 
structure of the network (Cranmer et al. 2012a). 
Endogenous Explanatory Factors 
  Prior studies on IGO collaborations (Balas 2011a, 2011b) do not address the complex 
dependencies in the formation of IGO partnerships. Collaborations among IGOs constitute a 
network process as the presence or absence of collaboration between any two IGOs in 
peace missions can account for the collaboration between other pairs of IGOs, hence 
“rendering the edges of the network dependent on one another” (Cranmer et al. 2014, 6).  
  Endogenous structures that are instrumental to the network generating process in 
peace operations represent “a full departure from what is possible with standard regression 
models” or other approaches to theory building and testing (Cranmer et al. 2012b, 299). 
Entailed here are such factors as dyadic and triadic dynamics and the notion of transitivity. 
Triadic Closure  
  A triad is composed of any set of three network actors (e.g., IGOs in peace 
operations networks). Similar to the process laid out by Heider’s (1958) cognitive balance 
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theory that suggests that “when two people like each other and agree about a topic, such as 
their feelings about a third, then cognitive balance occurs” (Felmlee and Faris 2013, 448), 
the classic process of triadic closure (Rapoport 1957) in peace operations occurs when two 
IGOs which do not collaborate with one another, but each have a collaborative link with a 
third IGO, decide to cooperate. This process then creates a triangle (a set of three IGOs 
which are all tied; see Goodreau et al. 2009), which is the simplest network structure that 
represents the advantage of a closed network (Carpenter et al. 1998). This pattern of 
connection, i.e., closed clusters, generates a network of interdependent social exchanges 
wherein certain people become trusted exchange partners, conceivably in distinction from a 
distrusted third party, who can be called upon for resources and support (Oh et al. 2004), 
and thus, is often associated with social capital in which organizations know each other 
“providing extensive redundancy and cross-checking of information within the closed group” 
(Berardo and Scholz 2010, 636).  
  In a similar vein, as expressed by Putnam (1995), Coleman (1988), and Goodreau et 
al. (2009), Cranmer et al. (2012b) triadic closure, i.e., closed networks, might be an 
appealing attribute of a collaboration network due to the very nature of collaborative relations 
in peace operations. Put differently, in peace operations risk of failure appears to be high 
(judged in part by the frequency of resumed hostilities), and so is the potential defection of 
stakeholders. 
  Group theory analysts suggest that actors cooperate for the common good from 
which they foresee and obtain benefit (Richardson 1993). Yet whereas collective action 
theorists challenge this argument by noting that actors may be able to benefit from 
collaboration without actually engaging in cooperation, in other words, when they can free-
ride (due to the greater commitment of some coalition leaders) or when they can obtain 
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private goods (as in the classic “stag hunt” fable, when hunters defect from an agreement to 
share a slain deer when they come upon or trap their own small game [Rousseau (1754), as 
cited in Skyrms (2001)]), they might choose to opt out. 
  While scholars generally agree that social networks afford important benefits to the 
members, they tend to disagree on which network patterns maximize these benefits. For 
some, as expressed earlier, collective action dilemmas can be overcome by forming dense, 
clustered, redundant and overlapping links among network actors (Berardo and Scholz 
2010). Yet Burt (1992), for example, pursues a different line of reasoning and contends that 
networks rich in “structural holes”—i.e., open structured networks—signify access to 
mutually unconnected partners or isolates, and, thus, are able to obtain and perhaps share 
many distinct information flows. The structural holes, consequently, minimize the flow of 
redundant information among network partners, and generate an information-rich and 
efficient network (Burt 1992). Therefore, for Burt (1992), structural holes are better for 
network actors as they would facilitate information flow since the broker(s) will enable actors 
on either side of the structural hole to have access to information. 
  On the contrary, in his seminal article “Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital”, Coleman (1988) notes that closed structures and networks in which nodes are 
densely tied to each other will provide the opportunity to convey needed resources and 
information. These closed networks, as they provide the information about network partners 
and their intentions, will motivate actors to treat each other in positive ways and hence 
enable them to develop trusting relationships that consequently might improve the 
effectiveness of the group’s collaborative efforts (Oh et al. 2004). Additionally, for Coleman 
(1990), Bourdieu (1986), and Putnam (1993), closed networks facilitate the access to social 
capital which helps to develop shared norms, and values among network members, and 
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information flow about their behavior, and therefore, are “indispensable in reducing the costs 
of negotiation between partners” (Todeva and Knoke 2005, 11). These closed networks may 
also facilitate share of information and experience about dealing effectively with a problem or 
problems to be solved. 
  Closed social structures are not only desired to generate effective norms but also “for 
another form of social capital: the trustworthiness of social structures that allows the 
proliferation of obligations and expectations” (Coleman 1988, 107). Accordingly, as 
expressed by Putnam (1995), densely connected structures would enable “maintaining 
credible commitments to collective solutions” (as cited in Lee et al. 2011, 565). With this 
respect, these closed structures enable the predictability of behavior of network partners, 
and constrain self-seeking opportunism (Walker et al. 1997). 
  Echoing earlier work, Cranmer et al. (2012b) note that closed triangles are favored as 
“commitments are more credible and communal security is better maximized than with other 
structures” (Cranmer et al. 2012b, 302). This indeed creates a “synergy” effect in alliance 
networks among states as well as IGOs that will afford higher expected utility to each 
stakeholder in the triad than “would be generated from a dyadic alliance that did not close a 
triangle” (Cranmer et al. 2012b, 302). 
  Hence even though alliances and collaborations present many opportunities for 
cheating, and free-riding; the development of trust, which contributes to the formation of 
social capital, will reduce the risk of opportunism, and consequently successful alliances (Olk 
and Earley 2000). As “trust is central to enduring and productive relational exchanges” 
(Robson et al. 2008, 647), while it facilitates cooperation among stakeholders, its absence 
complicates it (Harsch 2015). 
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  As stated earlier, the social capital literature underscores “a cognitive component, 
trust, which can emerge to support cooperation within the repeated interactions of closed 
groups” (Berardo and Scholz 2010, 636-637). This reasoning represents an alternative 
justification for the formation of a transitive triad: 
“Since E is already a trusted source of information for A and D is a trusted 
source for E, E is in a position to assure A of D’s trustworthiness. Furthermore, 
D is constrained from providing untimely or unreliable information to A 
because doing so may also affect D’s relationship with E. According to this 
vision, if actor A is most concerned with finding trustworthy policy contacts, 
then the link with D—the only possibility for forming a transitive triad— would 
be the preferred choice”  (Berardo and Scholz 2010, 636-637). 
 
  In short, endogenous mechanisms originate from the structuralist assumptions that 
the “selection of relationships, the maintenance of existing ones, the dissolution of old ones 
are conditioned by trust, information, and opportunities for interactions that are structured by 
the network” (Rivera et al. 2010, 98). 
  This analysis leads, therefore, to the following hypothesis regarding the likely pattern 
of IGO network formation: 
  Hypothesis 1: A preference of IGOs to form dense and closed networks, i.e., triadic 
closure, will manifest in the inter-organizational networking of peace operations. 
Prior Collaboration (Memory) 
  In relation to the point made earlier about organizational learning, while network 
effects and organizational attributes have straightforward appeal to explain the formation of 
inter-organizational collaboration in peace operations, they do not account for the effects of 
prior collaboration among IGOs. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) suggest that literature on 
networks should take the accumulation of prior ties between organizations into account in 
order to explain the formation of new inter-organizational ties (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) and 
persistence of prior ties. 
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  Evolutionary theories (McKelvey 1997) point out that “inertia alone would predict that 
a tie between actors at a previous point in time would increase the tendency of the tie to be 
maintained at a subsequent point in time” (Contractor et al. 2006, 292-293). In line with 
evolutionary theories, empirical studies on alliance formation have reported that 
organizations with prior collaboration (in general) are more likely to collaborate (Gulati 1995; 
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) since prior relations among organizations form a network structure 
in which most organizations can be embedded. Such networks shape the flow of information 
about capabilities, reliability and trustworthiness of the organizations in the network as well 
as new potential collaborators (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, as cited in Gulati et al. 2002). 
  Prior collaboration among organizations enables the formation of new ties through 
three means: timing, access, and referrals. Timing requires acquiring informational benefits 
about the potential partners at the right time. Access represents information about potential 
and current partners regarding their trustworthiness and capabilities. And referrals are 
particularly important in formation of collaborative relations since organizations may refer 
their existing partners to other organizations “for partnering or to enter three-way 
partnerships” (Gulati et al. 2002, 282).  
  Additionally, repeated collaborations augment mutual learning through creation of 
norms, values and common practices among collaborating partners (Gulati et al. 2002). Prior 
experience, furthermore, enhances trust since it breeds over time, and will not be manifest in 
first encounter (Hardin 2002). Trust (and presumably the converse, distrust) arises to 
“substitute for formal protections against the fear of being ripped off” (Todeva and Knoke 
2005, 14) and serves a guarantee against potential partner opportunism (Todeva and Knoke 
2005).  
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  Trust emerges in a partnership when the parties of the network have successfully 
completed transactions (Ring and Van de Ven 1994) and view collaboration partners as 
acting in “good faith and complying with the norms of equity” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, 
371). Put differently, had the previous partnership completed successfully, partners would be 
willing to persist their relations in the future, and would be more reluctant to engage in 
opportunist and self-serving, i.e., defecting, behavior (Maitland et al. 1985; Okamura and 
Vonortas 2004; Okamura 2008). 
  Trust not only engenders a shared understanding but also a higher level of 
knowledge transfer between the collaboration partners (Okamura 2008). Trust among 
partners, furthermore, allows organizations to access partners’ resources and to solve their 
problems when things do not work out as planned. Hence it enriches an organization’s 
“ability to compete and overcome problems” (Uzzi 1997, 43). 
  As Balas (2011) suggests, trust is central for the formation and maintenance of inter-
organizational collaboration, particularly on such “sensitive issues as peace operations” 
(Balas 2011, 28) where many lives—those of IGO personnel and those of local 
populations—are at stake. Lack of trust among peacekeeping IGOs is viewed to be one of 
the obstacles that discourage them from forming partnerships in the conflict zones. Paucity 
of NATO-EU cooperation prior to the Berlin Plus Agreement (2002), e.g., in Bosnia, for 
instance, was considered to be associated with lack of trust between these two organizations 
(Balas 2011). 
  In addition to the role of trust for forging cooperation, indirect links might account for 
collaborative ties among organizations. Common previous partners might facilitate or 
hamper the formation of alliances (Zirulia 2011). These previous collaborators play two roles. 
First, they provide information about potential partners for the formation of new collaboration 
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opportunities. Second, previous network partners reduce the “the asymmetric information 
among the potential partners, providing an indirect reputation effect” (Zirulia 2011, 61). 
  As noted earlier, prior collaborations would help organizations to gain familiarity with 
their staffs as well as bureaucratic, institutional and organizational culture, function and 
systems, and learn lessons from their previous cooperation, thus maximizing the benefits of 
mutual resource sharing and apportioned mission responsibilities. While trust takes time to 
develop, once trust is built it is to a great extent stable and “difficult to break” (Krackhardt 
1994, 220). 
  As such, I hypothesize that: 
  Hypothesis 2: IGOs that have collaborated in a prior time period are more likely to 
collaborate. 
Exogenous Explanatory Factors  
  In addition to network effects, i.e., endogenous explanations, the MTML model 
incorporates exogenous factors, e.g., organizational attributes that can account for the 
emergence of networks (Monge and Contractor 2003; Contractor et al. 2006). These will be 
considered in order. 
Homophily 
  Theories of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 
1987; McPherson et al. 2001) contend that actors associate themselves with similar others 
as they will seek out those that are like themselves. In a similar vein, in his experimental 
study on inter-group relations, Sherif (1958) asserts that individuals tend to select others who 
are similar since “by doing so they reduce the potential areas of conflict in the relationship” 
(Monge and Contractor 2001, 477). Shared beliefs, or belief systems among actors make 
networks coherent, and “can be seen as a precondition for actors with shared policy 
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preferences to coordinate their actions and build common strategies” (Ingold 2011; as cited 
in Fischer et al. 2012, 443).8 
  The principle of homophily implies that distance with regard to social or organizational 
characteristics translate into network distance, the number of ties, connections, “through 
which a piece of information must travel to connect two individuals” (McPherson et al. 2001, 
416). Echoing this argument, alliance formation theories contend that alliances are formed 
among nations, which share similar international policy preferences (Smith 1995). Similarly, 
organizations are expected to choose the ones that are similar to themselves regarding 
characteristics, such as status similarity, including organizational function, cultures norms 
and values (Monge and Contractor 2003; Shumate et al. 2005; Atouba and Shumate 2015). 
     Therefore, at the dyadic level, there is a greater tendency for similar actors to form 
mutual ties (Monge and Contractor 2003). Additionally, at the triadic level, in conjunction with 
homophily perspective, theories of generalized exchange and cognitive balance posit that 
“there is a greater tendency for cyclical ties among actors who share similar attributes” 
(Contractor et al. 2006, 691), e.g., similar organizational functions or types. Segil's (1998) 
research into two hundred companies found that seventy-five percent of these companies 
reported that alliance failure was caused by incompatibility of organizational and corporate 
cultures. For such companies managing the cultural differences and similarities between 
alliances partners is viewed as one of the most crucial elements of successful alliances. 
They, therefore, consider cultural compatibility a top priority in their relationships (Segil 1998; 
1999). For instance, it is often noted that having a reputation as a military organization 
composed of nominal democracies, it can be problematic for NATO to coordinate with non-
military or politically heterogeneous actors, e.g., the OSCE, since that organization is “less 
                                                
8 This could be a factor hampering cooperation between Anglophone and Francophone 
institutions in Western African peace missions as well.  
  
 
   
36 
aware of the civilian dimensions of crisis management, and reluctant to become coordinated 
itself, while aiming to coordinate others” (Major and Molling 2009, 26). While inter-
organizational collaborations provide mechanisms to deal with problems such as 
environmental instability and uncertainty, they are plagued with complicated problems such 
as transaction costs. The organizational economics literature notes that transaction costs 
frequently increase since heterogeneous actors in a potential collaboration have conflicting 
interests that can increase information, negotiation and enforcement costs (Lee et al., 2012). 
In this sense, collaborations between organizations with institutional, organizational, 
structural, and particularly cultural similarities are favored as compared to such 
collaborations with dissimilar organizations in order to reduce collaboration hazards (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny 1994) or transaction costs (Feiock and Scholz, 2010; Lubell, 2007).                                           
As a strategic behavior to minimize transaction costs (Feiock & Scholz 2010) or to reduce 
collaboration hazards (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999; Podolny 1994), organizations in general 
select partners who have intrinsic similarities. This argument would still hold even if there 
were relatively few potential partners to choose from, as in peace mission deployed in 
internal armed conflicts, since coordination problems would presumably outweigh decision of 
convenience. While cooperation across sectors is still a key element to successful inter-
organizational (inter-sectoral) collaboration, both governments and nongovernmental entities 
also have been seen to partner with others possessing a similar organizational type. That is, 
in addition to similarity of organizational function, homophily with regard to organizational 
type, coded as regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations, may determine if two 
IGOs would forge collaborative relations in the field since organizations with similar 
organizational structure and bureaucracies would have a better understanding of how these 
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organizations operate and decisions are made as organizational similarity promotes a 
common understanding between IGOs and will help them to sort out their differences. 
            These lead to the following hypotheses.  
            Hypothesis 3: IGOs sharing the same organizational function are more likely to 
collaborate in conducting peace operations.  
            Hypothesis 4: IGOs sharing the same organizational type, i.e., regional, sub-
regional, or extra-regional, are more likely to collaborate in peace operations.  
Theories of Exchange and Resource Dependence  
  One of the biggest obstacles to enhanced involvement of regional and sub-regional 
organizations in peace operations has been the lack of capacity to launch such operations 
as they involve “more than just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light 
infantry force for peacekeeping” (The Challenges Project 2005, 18).  
  Given that sufficient financial, material and human resources can be lacking in peace 
operations, it is difficult for IGOs to undertake such missions without collaboration with other 
organizations (Morrison and Blair 1999; UNU-CRIS 2008). Conducting multifunctional 
missions with many complementary aspects, such as the provision of essential enabling 
capabilities and heavy equipment in order to launch and maintain efficient and effective 
operations, (The Challenges Project 2005) thus can require IGOs to pool their assets and to 
focus on “modular” missions rather than relying on parallel command systems (Gowan and 
Sherman 2012).  
  During modular missions each IGO undertakes a different task, complementing each 
other in terms of human and financial resources. By doing so, they mobilize and utilize their 
resources more effectively. Therefore while theories of homophily suggest that actors are 
more likely to forge ties with those who share similar attributes, such as organizational 
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function, theories of exchange (Blau 1964), which attempt to explain human action as a 
calculus of exchange of information and resources, “posit ties among actors who differ in 
certain attributes” (Contractor et al. 2006, 690), mutually complementing each other. 
  IGOs such as the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and Arab League cannot carry out peace missions on their own, and thus turn to 
organizations with significant additional capacity such as the EU, NATO and the UN for 
assets, e.g., heavy airlift, medical supplies and facilities, training and information gathering. 
To illustrate, though the AU has launched peace missions in the field for about a decade, it 
“has often struggled to get the equipment it needs and to build up headquarters” (Gowan and 
Sherman 2012, 2). Its mission in Darfur, for instance, received support from various extra-
regional organizations, such as the EU, NATO and UN, and was converted into a hybrid AU-
UN mission in 2008 (Gowan and Sherman 2012, 2). 
  As noted earlier, complementarity plays an essential role in driving organizations to 
forge social ties. According to resource dependence and exchange theories, organizations 
fabricate ties on the basis of their need to obtain material and financial resources and access 
information from other organizations and of “their ability to provide their own valuable 
material, informational resources in exchange” (Atouba and Shumate 2010, 296; Aldrich and 
Prefer 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
  An organization forms alliances and partnerships with other organizations to “plug a 
skill or resource gap” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, 373). Specialization and differentiation 
among organizations’ networks arise from the difficulty of any single organization “achieving 
self-sufficiency, thus requiring most organizations to enter into transactions (e.g., 
collaboration) with others to obtain resources that cannot be generated internally” (Aldrich 
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1976, 421). Put differently, forming partnerships with other organizations is the most practical 
alternative to obtain needed resources (Mitchell and Singh 1996) and even to survive. 
  Resource acquisition, therefore, becomes the major driving force behind the 
emergence of inter-organizational relations (Van de Ven et al. 1975; Aldrich 1976; Dietrich 
1994), which, consequently, leads to “supplementary as well as complementary relations 
with other organizations” (Aldrich 1976, 425). Hence organizations seek to minimize power 
differentials in their relationships with other organizations to reduce uncertainty in their 
relations, and to enhance their organizational performance (Gulati and Singh 2007) through 
the use of exchange ties (Atouba and Shumate 2010, 307). 
  Empirical findings have verified many of these suppositions. Research on inter-
organizational collaborations had found that organizations forge ties with other organizations 
which have complementary capabilities and resources (Oliver 1990; Powell et al. 1996, 
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Okamura and Venerates 2004; Park 
and Mezias 2005), since as Hamel et al. (1989) suggest, for collaboration to be successful 
and effective each partner must contribute something distinctive. Thus by sharing resources 
through networking, organizations not only focus on their comparative advantages (Alagappa 
1999; Murdie 2013) but also avoid duplication of efforts by dividing their labor and 
responsibilities (Murdie 2013). Additionally, collaborations help organizations to learn from 
each other (Hamel et al. 1989; Hamel 1991; Khanna et al. 1998) and to utilize partnerships 
to build new skills and technologies, which will be diffused throughout the organization. 
Alliances enhance the capacity and capabilities of alliance partners against outsiders, and 
curtail the costs and risks of entering new businesses or markets (Hamel et al. 1989). In 
addition to intentional learning of skills and techniques, in peace missions IGOs may also 
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learn by trial and error with each other, evolving more effective practices and operations 
across repeated collaborations. 
  The cooperation between NATO and the UN in Afghanistan epitomizes how 
complementary of capabilities result in an increased collaboration among stakeholders. As of 
2008, the increasingly dangerous and complex Afghani operational environment led NATO 
and the UN to enhance their collaboration. The NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) reportedly viewed the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) 
legitimacy as necessary to muster domestic support, while UNAMA needed ISAF’s military 
and logistical capabilities to be able to operate and execute its tasks in unstable parts of the 
country (Harsch 2015). 
  In short, even though organizations with a similar policy and ideological focus might 
be more likely to form ties with one another (homophily), we might also expect that 
organizations possessing different resource capacities, including the reputational 
advantages appropriate to certain missions and zones of operation, have a propensity to 
forge collaborative ties. For instance, even though the UN to a large extent is capable of 
generating resources and deploying civilian capabilities in addition to military ones, the 
organization is in need of high-tech capabilities, such as attack helicopters and intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets (Lijn et al. 2015), which are often provided by NATO 
or the EU. 
  Incorporating these theories the following, and in effect rival hypothesis emerges: 
  Hypothesis 5: IGOs with contrasting resource capacity—resource level heterophily— 
are more likely to collaborate in peace operations. 
Proximity and Geographical Region-Based Homophily 
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  Proximity breeds formation of ties. The law of propinquity (Allen 1977; Krackhardt 
1994) posits, “the probability of two people communicating is inversely proportional to the 
distance between them” (Krackhardt 1994, 213). Physical proximity among partners affords 
them “an ability to exercise influence in a way that the more distant partner is unable to 
achieve” (Glaister et al. 2004, 62) as close geographical presence provides the opportunity 
to develop regular contact (Glaister et al. 2004). Similarly, organizations located in the same 
geographical region, i.e., geographically homophilous, are expected to be more likely to 
engage in collaboration relations as geographical homophily, not only facilitate the formation 
of ties but also the persistence of them. In other words, proximity and geographical region-
based homophily influence “the persistence of social ties by moderating the effort required to 
maintain relationships” (Rivera et al. 2010, 106). 
  It has been shown that proximity engenders ties among organizations, firms, 
companies as well as states. In Origins of Alliances, Walt (1987), for instance, suggests that 
states located in the same geographical regions and/or in close proximity are more likely to 
form alliances since they will recognize and are affected by the same regional threats and 
form alliances to deter them, thus banding together for common security (Walt 1987; also 
see Gibler and Vasquez 1998). Should we apply this reasoning to the case of collaboration 
between extra-regional, regional and sub-regional organizations, we would expect that 
organizations in close proximity and located in the same geographical region would be more 
likely to collaborate as they “live with the consequences of unresolved conflicts and cannot 
simply withdraw from them. The EU and NATO collaboration in Bosnia is a case in point” 
(Hettne and Söderbaum 2006, 230). 
  Organizational studies suggest that proximity also lessens the cost of information flow 
(Boschma 2005; Ter Wal 2014) and facilitates, and thus, increases personal contacts in 
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inter-firm or inter-organizational relations (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003; Atouba and 
Shumate 2010). Furthermore, proximity increases resource efficiency. To illustrate, the UN 
has reported to increase its resource efficiency by promoting burden sharing, and 
cooperating with regional and sub-regional organizations (The Challenges Project 2005, 19). 
  As much as regional cooperation is desired since it would reduce information and 
transaction costs associated with inter-organizational collaboration, its absence could result 
in protracted conflicts and failed peace missions. Syria is a case in point; inter alia, the lack 
of cooperation among regional organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and the Organizations of the Islamic Conference in 2014-2015, due in part to 
regional political rivalries and polarization, not only impaired their credibility but also 
presumably emboldened the Assad Regime and other extremist groups in the region. 
Although proximity theories and geographical region-based homophily are similar, the latter 
describes a tendency to select others in “a larger space or geographic area than those in 
which proximity mechanisms traditionally operate” (Atouba and Shumate 2015, 590). 
  In light of the theoretical ground for expecting a relationship between proximity and 
geographical region-based homophily, and organizational behavior, I pose the following 
hypotheses: 
  Hypothesis 6: IGOs headquartered in the same geographical region are more likely 
to collaborate. 
  Hypothesis 7: Proximity should positively predict the inter-organizational 
collaboration among IGOs in peace operations. 
Prior Bad Experience  
  Though prior collaborative relations may determine if IGOs would collaborate in the 
future or these collaborative links will persist, how the prior collaboration has resulted—
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whether it was a bad or good experience, good and bad news effect (Pearson et al. (2013), 
may account for if two IGOs will retain their partnership. 
  The inertia in deployment of peace operations in the late 1990s has often been 
associated with the failures and violence inflicted upon peacekeepers in Somalia, Rwanda 
and Srebrenica in the early 1990s. For instance, it is noted that the US, though it is not an 
IGO, has become reluctant to deploy forces and engage in peace missions following the 
failed US peacekeeping and enforcement mission in Somalia in 1993 (Babarinde 1993). 
  Even though analysts find that peace operations are becoming less dangerous (Lijn 
and Smit 2015), peacekeepers remain to be targets of attacks by extremists and terrorist 
groups, as was the case in Mali and Central African Republic, and were held hostages by 
jihadis (e.g., in Syria) (Lijn and Smit 2015). The demand for peace operations continue, so 
does the demand for effective peacekeeping. Although IGOs would continue to deploy 
peacekeepers in conflict zones, they may strive not to repeat collaborations that have been 
ineffective and in which they have suffered high number of casualties. Expressed differently, 
it should be expected that organizational dyads that have suffered great losses, prior bad 
experience, would be reluctant to repeat their collaborations in the future. 
  Therefore, while collaborative relations that have been good experiences and viewed 
as successes (with regard to safety and security of peacekeepers) would be more likely to 
be repeated, IGOs would eschew retaining their partnerships with the organizations with 
which their prior collaborative efforts suffered heavy losses and viewed as failures in that 
regard. 
  Hypothesis 8: Collaborations between IGO dyads that are considered as bad 
experiences would be less likely to be repeated. 
 Conclusion  
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  This chapter has provided a detailed theoretical framework to explore the factors that 
motive the formation, evolution and dissolution of inter-organizational collaborations among 
IGOs engaged in peace operations, and laid out a series of hypotheses relating to both 
network formation and mission success. The following chapters present findings regarding 
the determinants of inter-organizational collaboration in peace operations and discuss how 
these peace operation networks; their structural properties and composition might be 
associated with the success/failure of peace missions.  
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CHAPTER 3 TESTING THE THEORY OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION  
Introduction 
  Previous chapters argued that collaboration among intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) in peace operations can be thought of as a network process and the factors that may 
determine the formation of these collaborative relations can be examined in a network 
perspective. This chapter studies the role of network effects and exogenous covariates, such 
as organizational resource capacity, function, and organizational type, in accounting for the 
formation, evolution—small changes occurring between the consecutively observed 
networks (Snijders 2005, 215)—and dissolution of partnerships and collaborative links 
among IGOs in conducting peace operations. In subsequent chapters we will examine the 
outcomes of these collaborative operations, i.e., how they affect the performance of peace 
operations. 
  This chapter proceeds as follows: first, the network research design, and discussion 
of exponential random graph models and their extension to temporal data models are 
provided; next, I consider the variables and model specification; then I deal with results and 
discussion of goodness of fit tests.  
Research Design  
Exponential Random Graph Models  
  One of this study's main contributions is demonstrating that relations among IGOs in 
conducting peace missions can be usefully studied by utilizing network analysis. In this 
regard, IGOs are considered nodes, and relationships among them, such as resource and 
information exchange, are termed links or ties, “represented as a line between the two 
points” (Desmarais et al. 2012, 288).  
  
 
   
46 
  I estimate a model of network formation, evolution and dissolution, and fit an 
exponential random graph model (ERGM). The ERGM is a tie-focused statistical network 
model (Harris 2014) and a method that “is flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of 
theories of network generation” (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012, 403). That is, in addition to 
the effect of exogenous explanatory variables, such as organizational attributes, the ERGMs 
(aka p* models) examine “how the various endogenous characteristics of a matrix of network 
relations” (Wasserman and Pattison 1996, as cited in Monge and Contractor 2001, 488) can 
account for network outcomes, such as the formation of collaborative relations among IGOs 
in peace operations. The ERGMs therefore afford a flexible way to simulate features 
common in social networks, e.g., propensities for friend-of-a-friend triadic closure (Krivitsky 
2012). 
  In other words, ERG models can incorporate different network configurations, such as 
mutual dyads, representing two ties “between the nodes, one going in one direction and the 
other going in the opposite direction” (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 124), into a model and 
examine which processes account for the formation of the network structure (Lusher and 
Robins 2013). To illustrate, the ERGMs can address questions such as “whether in the 
observed network there are significantly more, or less, structural characteristics of interest 
than expected by chance” (Robins et al. 2007, 175). These structural characteristics, e.g., 
presence of dyadic relations, triadic ties, and centralization, can be viewed as the outcomes 
of local social processes that formed the examined network (Robins et al. 2007), and 
illustrate the changing patterns of IGO partnerships in executing peace operations. 
  The use of regression methods on IGO collaborations violates the critical assumption 
of observational independence that these models require. That is, should a dyad of IGOs 
conditions its alliance behavior on the behavior of other dyads of IGOs, then the basic 
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assumption that allows for the creation of joint likelihood is violated (Cranmer et al. 2012a). 
Regression models furthermore are not robust to the violation of independence assumptions 
stem from relational data. The main problem is that when independence assumption is 
violated, “regression models are biased in a way that can lead the researcher to believe that 
covariates have much stronger effects on the outcome of interest than they actually do” 
(Cranmer et al. 2012a, 282). 
  Different from traditional regression models, ERGMs move away from independence 
assumptions. By doing so, these models make modeling relational data and network effects 
(endogenous variables), such as triadic closure, possible. Thus, “the key difference in the 
way one must think of inference in an ERGM context versus a regression context is that the 
ERGM treats the entire network as a single observation” (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 292). That is 
to say, though treating each dyadic link or pair (of IGOs) as a conditionally independent 
observation, an ERG model “considers the whole network of ties to be one observation from 
a complex multivariate distribution—thus making it completely free of independence 
assumptions—and then asks what the probability of observing that network is compared to a 
random network with the same number of nodes” (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 292-293). That is, 
ERG models treat the observed network as the dependent variable, e.g., presence/absence 
of collaborative relations among a set of actors, and fit structural parameters—endogenous 
effects— and covariates—exogenous effects—to explain formation and structure of the 
network (Prell 2012). 
  More broadly, ERGMs allow analysts to incorporate assumptions of interdependence 
(Lubell et al. 2012), and thereby assess whether the network structure, such as presence of 
dense clusters, or absence of closed triangles, are unique features of the network studied, or 
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a result of a random process (Cranmer et al. 2012b). In this way we should be able to 
discover the signature or likely structure and pattern of IGO networks in peace operations. 
  As noted above, ERGMs allow researchers to include two types of statistics/relations 
to account for network formation. Endogenous effects account for relational processes or 
local network configurations that are formed as a result of social structural processes (Wang 
et al. 2015). Endogenous variables can be operationalized to capture “theoretically 
interesting relational processes” (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 291), such as clustering that account 
for the formation of a specific network.   
  Exogenous effects/covariates, on the contrary, are the attributes, e.g., organizational 
security function or organizational type that significantly help explain network formation 
processes. For example, an analyst can include certain exogenous effects, such as race, 
gender, or age, to examine formation of friendship networks. Exogenous parameters, similar 
to regression coefficients, “give the effects of the respective network statistics on the 
likelihood of observing a particular realization of the network” (Desmarais and Cranmer 
2012, 404). Should endogenous, i.e. network, effect not matter for formation of the 
network—e.g., there is no dyadic or relational property, the ERG model reduces to a logistic 
regression model in terms of the exogenous attributes (Krivitsky 2012); thus, “the parameters 
assigned to the covariate effects will be exactly equal to coefficients in a logistic regression” 
(Cranmer et al. 2012a, 294), and will be interpreted as such.            
  Thus a parameter coefficient generated by the ERGM is interpreted as a regression 
coefficient. Therefore, a positive parameter denotes the likelihood of observing networks with 
larger values of the statistic that we modeled than would be expected if “the network were 
drawn at random from a uniform distribution of networks” (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 293). Again, 
similar to regression coefficients, if the coefficient pertaining to the modeled parameter is 
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significant from zero, it can be interpreted as statistically significant. And thus, it significantly 
influences the probability of “observing a particular instance of that network, controlling for 
the other statistics in the analysis” (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 294). 
  In investigating the formation and evolution of IGO collaboration networks, I utilize a 
statistical method that analyzes and captures dynamic changes in these collaborative inter-
IGO networks. The Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM), an extension of 
ERG models to discrete time-series of networks—modeling networks that are observed at a 
number of discrete time points (Robins and Pattison 2001; Snijders 2005; Hanneke et el. 
2010)—explains “higher-order inter-temporal dependence” (Cranmer et al. 2014, 9) in 
network structure. The TERGM can simultaneously test the formation, evolution and 
dissolution of networks (Hanneke et al. 2010, Cranmer et al. 2014) and model endogenous 
and exogenous covariate effects that drive the formation of such networks. Put differently, 
the TERGM makes it possible to model and estimate the structural properties of IGO 
collaboration networks over time without the independence assumption among independent 
variables of traditional statistical approaches.  
Model Specification and Variables  
Dependent Variable  
  This study examines the collaborative relations forged by IGOs engaged in peace 
operations between 1990-2013. The dependent variable is the adjacency matrix—network—
of IGO collaborations in peace operations for each year under study. The adjacency matrix 
for a network with n actors—nodes, e.g., IGOs—is an nXn matrix whose each cell is “1” if 
two nodes have a tie, “0” if they do not.  
  In dynamic networks we suppose that we have M repeated observations on a 
network with the same set of g actors. The observed networks are represented with 
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adjacency matrices X (tm) = (Xij (tm)) for m = 1,…., M, where i and j range from 1 to g. In that 
sense, the variable Xij (t) denotes whether at time t there is a link from i to j—value 1— or 
not—value 0. And the adjacency matrix’s diagonal is 0, Xii(t) = 0 for all i (Snijders 2005).   
  I constructed adjacency matrices that represent the absence/presence of 
collaborative relations between IGOs engaged in peace missions for each year between 
1990-2013. Data on inter-organizational collaboration among IGOs in peace operations are 
drawn from the Dyadic Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations Dataset compiled by Balas 
(2011b), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace 
Operations database, IGO reports, and briefings.  
  The unit of analysis is the presence (or absence) of collaborative relations in each 
IGO dyad (represented by each cell in the adjacency matrix) included in the model. As I 
examine and focus on 20 IGOs, there are 400 observations (cells in the adjacency matrix) 
for each year under study, and 24 years of observation results in 9600 total observations 
(N=9600).                                                                                                                                                                                      
Independent Variables 
Prior Collaboration (Memory) 
  In the light of the theoretical premises and hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 
regarding the role of prior collaboration in inducing future collaborations, I include an 
autoregression statistic to examine whether current ties and network structures depend on 
previous ties, i.e., collaboration at a previous point in time which includes both the same or a 
different conflict. This statistic shows characteristics such as edge innovation, i.e., formation 
of new relationships/ties among IGOs, and edge loss—dissolution of ties— and thus, helps 
us determine whether previous ties, i.e., partnerships, collaborative relations, are carried 
forward and maintained. The dynamics of edge stability or “memory,” as Desmarais and 
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Cranmer (2011) term it, indicate if ties in current time period are to be current edges (ties) 
carried over from the previous year. In other words, the memory term captures the 
persistence in collaborative ties (Desmarais and Cranmer 2011), and demonstrates whether 
the relations among IGOs either within the same operation or over different operations in 
peace operations endure.  
Triadic Closure  
  It was hypothesized that closed triangles should be a feature of IGO networks in 
peace operations (a positive coefficient) since collaborations with high failure rate, such as 
peace operations, are conducive to defection and free-riding, and closed triangles and dense 
networks are regarded as a panacea for collective action problems (Berardo and Scholz 
2010). Such closed network structures are believed to breed trust among network members 
(Coleman 1988). In order to capture this effect, I included a statistic that counts the number 
of closed triangles in IGO networks. The triadic closure parameter counts the number of 
triangles defined by IGO ‘A’ having collaborations with IGO ‘B’ and IGO ‘C’ when IGOs ‘B’ 
and ‘C’ are also collaborating with each other.  
  In relation to the point made earlier it is important to control for several exogenous 
covariates that the literature suggests should determine the formation, and evolution of inter-
organizational networks. I include the organizational function, organizational type, and 
resource capacity as organizational attributes that may determine the formation and 
persistence of collaborative relations among IGOs in conducting peace operations. 
Organizational Function  
  The model includes organizational function as one of the exogenous covariates to 
examine whether the formation and maintenance of the studied networks are driven by 
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homophily. Organizational function is coded for each organization based on the majority of 
activities they engage in conducting peace missions.9 
  Organizational function is coded for each organization based on the majority of 
activities they engage in conducting peace missions. I coded organizations as civilian, such 
as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European 
Union (EU), military, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and mixed 
organizations, e.g., African Union (AU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS).10 
Organizational Resource Capacity  
  In order to examine the role of resource dependence and interdependence in 
determining the formation of ties among IGOs in peace operations, the model includes 
organizations’ level of resource capacity as an exogenous covariate. For organizational 
capacity coding, albeit with some modifications, I relied on Pearson et al.’s (2013) 
operationalization of IGOs as large, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mid-
level, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and limited capacity, such as 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)11, based on human and financial resource at their disposal. The data is 
derived from IGO websites and reports.  
  An absolute difference term is used to model the relationship between organizational 
resource capacity and formation of collaborative relations between IGOs. Absolute difference 
terms add one network statistic to the model equal to the sum of absolute difference 
between two IGOs’ resource capacity for all nodes in the network (Morris et al. 2008). For 
                                                
9 This coding is similar to Balas’ (2011b) operationalization of organizational security culture. 
10 There are 13 civilian, 2 military and 5 mixed IGOs.  
11 There are 3 large, 6 mid-level and 11 limited capacity organizations.  
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instance, as a limited capacity organization IGAD is coded “1” and ECOWAS is coded “2” as 
an organization with mid-level capacity. And the absolute difference term included in the 
model accounts for this difference, that is, “1,” with regard to these organizations’ resource 
capacity level.  
  Thus, I expect that coefficient estimate for resource capacity would be positive, 
suggesting a heterophily effect, i.e., formation of collaborative relations between IGOs with 
different resource capacity.  
Organizational Type  
  Organizations are coded as regional IGOs, such as African Union (AU), sub-regional 
IGOs, e.g., Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and extra-
regional organizations, such as NATO and the Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries (CPLP).1213 
Proximity and Geographical Region-Based Homophily 
  Drawing on the law of propinquity and theories of homophily, the model also includes 
the physical distance between IGO headquarters, i.e., proximity of headquarters, as an 
explanatory variable.14 The latitude and longitude of cities are used as coordinates to 
calculate the distance between two IGO headquarters. 
  Additionally, the model takes the geographical region-based homophily into account 
to capture if IGOs located in the same geographical region are more likely to collaborate. 
The geographical regions in which IGOs are headquartered are coded as: Africa, Europe, 
Americas, Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific. 
                                                
12 The UN is coded as an extra-regional organization. 
13 There are 4 regional, 11 sub-regional, and 5 extra-regional organizations.  
14 I do not model the distance between the IGO headquarters and the conflict country.  
  
 
   
54 
  I expect a negative effect for geographical distance indicator, suggesting that the 
greater the distance between two IGOs, the less likely they would collaborate. On the 
contrary, I expect a positive relationship between IGO collaborations and geographical 
region-based homophily. 
Prior Bad Experience  
  The number of casualties suffered by IGO dyads per year is used as a proxy for 
determining a bad experience effect. The casualty data are drawn from the UN Fatalities 
Statistics (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml) and SIPRI 
Multilateral Peace Operations database. 
Isolates 
  Furthermore, an isolate term is included in the model as I expect to find that a 
considerable number of IGOs, though their mandates include protecting 
regional/international peace and security, are not geared toward collaborating with other 
IGOs even if they deploy coincident missions. The isolate term adds one statistic to the 
model equal to the number of isolates in a given network. Isolates are denoted as the nodes 
with degree zero, i.e., with no ties, suggesting they participate in peace operations but do not 
collaborate with other IGOs (Morris et al. 2008).  
Table 3.1. Independent Variables and Expected Effect  
Network Dynamics Level Expected Effect 
Endogenous Effects   
Prior Collaboration (Memory) Network + 
Triadic Closure Network + 
Exogenous Effects   
Organizational Function Dyad + 
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Organizational Resource 
Capacity Heterophily 
Dyad + 
Organizational Type 
Homophily 
Dyad + 
Prior Bad Experience Dyad - 
Proximity Dyad - 
Geographical Region-Based 
Homophily 
Dyad + 
Isolates Network + 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the variables and network effects included in the model, 
and at which level these variables are measured. The table also demonstrates the direction 
of the effect I expect these variables to have on IGO collaboration network.  
Results 
Why Do Intergovernmental Organizations Collaborate in Peace Operations? 
  Analytical results partially confirm the hypotheses laid out in previous chapter 
(Chapter 2). The results from the TERGM model (see Table 3.2) confirm the expectations 
with regard to the structural properties of IGO collaboration networks in peace operations. As 
I hypothesized, in addition to the role of organizational attributes (modeled as exogenous 
covariates), endogenous factors, i.e., triadic closure and memory effect representing prior 
collaborations, account for the formation and persistence of inter-organizational collaboration 
among IGOs in peace operations. Hypothesis 1 expected to find that IGOs would be likely to 
form dense and closed networks in conducting peace operations. The coefficient for triadic 
closure parameter is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a friend-of-a-friend 
mechanism does play a role in partnering with other organizations in undertaking peace 
operations’ tasks. For instance, NATO has “exerted its military muscles in several operations 
since the end of the Cold War in Europe” (Dominguez 2011, 75) and outside of its primary 
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region of concern, such as Africa. In the majority of African peacekeeping efforts, however, 
the collaboration between NATO and African regional organizations has been through the 
UN. NATO has “contributed to UN efforts in African capacity building” (Koops and Tardy 
2015, 66), and collaborated with the African regional and sub-regional organizations through 
logistical and military support provided to the UN’s African missions.  
  Finally my estimate with regard to the prior relationships, i.e., memory effect, provides 
a strong support for the importance of prior relationships to account for persistence of 
partnerships. 
  This finding indicates that prior collaborations to some extent help IGOs to get familiar 
with their bureaucracies, norms and how things are run and done, which presumably 
enhances the possibility of future cooperation. More specifically, the results suggest that 
once partnership is formed between the two IGOs, it is likely to be maintained, i.e., carried 
over, including collaborations from year to year and mission to mission. Expressed 
differently, once initiated, these inter-organizational partnerships are rarely reversed or 
dissolve following their initiation (Haugevik 2007). Indeed, Haugevick (2007) argues that the 
inter-organizational relationships among IGOs, such as NATO and UN cooperation in 
Kosovo, AU-UN partnership in Sudan and Burundi, involve a certain degree of path-
dependency, that is, “once the choice to cooperate has been made, it is difficult to turn back, 
due to the time, resources and prestige already invested” (Haugevik 2007, 7) even if IGOs 
sometimes may withdraw once their particular job has been done or accomplished.  
Table 3.2. Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models, 1990-2013 
Network Dynamics Coefficient Estimates Standard Error 
Endogenous Effects   
Prior Collaboration (Memory) 3.137*** 0.241 
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Triadic Closure 1.529*** 0.188 
Exogenous Effects   
Organizational Function 
Homophily 
-0.171 0.196 
Organizational Resource 
Capacity Heterophily 
0.314* 0.218 
Organizational Type 
Homophily 
-0.454* 0.220 
Prior Bad Experience 0.008. 0.005 
Proximity 0.01** 0.003 
Geographical Region-Based 
Homophily 
0.090 0.253 
Isolates 1.937*** 0.193 
 
 (Notes. Statistical significance:  <0 ‘***’>, <0.001 ‘**’>, <0.01 ‘*’>,  <0.05 ‘.’>, <0.1 ‘ ’ 
1.>,  N=9600)  
 
  Hypothesis 3 stated that IGOs sharing similar attributes, which will be manifest in 
organizational function, would be more likely to collaborate as opposed to the ones with 
different organizational functions. Interestingly, I do not find any significant support for this 
hypothesis. Nor is the coefficient in the hypothesized direction. Indeed, some analysts note 
that complementarity, rather than the similarity, of organizational functions may lead to 
collaboration on the ground between two IGOs. Organizations with different security cultures 
also may be deployed to handle different aspects and phases of peace operations. In 
Kosovo, for instance, while OSCE (a civilian organization) carried out institution building and 
democratization, the UN (a civilian and military organization) has undertaken tasks such as 
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humanitarian assistance and civilian administration, and NATO (a military organization) 
launched a military campaign (Solana 1999).15 Therefore, complementary organizational 
functions rather than the similar ones might be more desirable for organizations to forge ties, 
and presumably to conduct more effective missions. 
  Another finding of note relates to assumptions about organizational type homophily. I 
expected that similar organizations in regard to their type, i.e., regional, sub-regional, and 
extra-regional, would be more likely to collaborate because they would be more familiar with 
their bureaucracies, decision making schemes, and policies, as well as local conditions. Yet, 
the coefficient is negative (and statistically significant) suggesting that heterophily, not 
homophily in terms of organizational type, induces collaborative relations among 
peacekeeping IGOs.  
  This negative coefficient may not be surprising given the fact that on the one hand, 
many of these sub-regional or regional organizations may lack either military muscles or 
financial and human resources and capabilities to deploy peace operations on their own; 
thus, they would call upon assistance from IGOs with required capacities. On the other hand, 
extra-regional IGOs, such as the UN, often seek out assistance from regional and sub-
regional organizations as they afford legitimacy to muster regional and local, and even 
international support.  
  Hypothesis 5 posited that organizational attributes regarding organizational resource 
capacity would indeed present a heterophily effect, indicating that since many organizations 
may lack resources to carry out peace operations’ tasks, they would be more likely to team 
up with organizations with mid-level or high capacity. As expected, the coefficient for this 
resource capacity parameter is positive (as it shows the difference between resource levels), 
                                                
15 All of these missions were assumed to be well coordinated and they checked out with 
each other. 
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and statistically significant. The direction of the relationship—the positive coefficient—may 
be interpreted as providing evidence for theories of resource dependence and exchange. As 
expressed earlier, resource dependency and exchange theories posit that organizations form 
ties on the basis of their comparative advantages and need for resources. In inter-
organizational peace operations networking, the need for cooperation arises in part due to 
the fact that one IGO cannot necessarily provide all resources required to carry out 
multidimensional peace missions. 
  The majority of IGOs, e.g., Asian, African regional and sub-regional organizations, 
lack military capabilities, management and operational capacities to tackle regional peace 
and security challenges (Holt and Shanahan 2005). Hence they have to work with and rely 
on other IGOs to improve their capabilities to be able to address security questions in their 
respective regions and finance their operations. As Koops and Tardy (2015) underscore, the 
UN is the theoretical interlocutor for any peace operation. Collaborations between the UN 
and regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations are generally marked by 
asymmetries regarding the level of organizational resource capacity. Sometimes these 
differences have even reportedly led to inter-organizational frictions, as when African 
peacekeeping troops were paid less than their counterparts from outside the region. 
  On the one hand, the UN contributes to peacekeeping IGOs, particularly the ones in 
Africa, which suffer from a capability deficit in capacity-building (Koops and Tardy 2015). On 
the other hand, the UN’s deployment in multidimensional missions, e.g., ones in Afghanistan, 
or Sudan, which entail “robust forces, air and sea transport, and aerial reconnaissance 
capabilities” (Harsch and Varwick 2009, 31) are supported by IGOs, such as NATO and the 
EU, that can deliver required capabilities. NATO, for instance, offered its support to the UN-
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AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that succeeded the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) on January 2008 (Dominguez 2011, 69).  
  Along the same lines, both regional organizations and the UN require each other’s 
support and resources. As the UN is experiencing a decline in its power and authority owing 
to its image as being unrepresentative and biased for much of the world (Lyman 2000), it 
needs support from regional bodies and arrangements (Hettne and Soderbaum 2006). To 
illustrate, in addition to its civilian missions deployed alongside the UN—missions in Kosovo 
and Bosnia—the EU has launched three military operations to support UN peacekeeping 
missions in Congo, i.e., EUFOR RD Congo and “Artemis”, and in Chad, EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
(Koops and Tardy 2015). 
  The evidence is mixed on whether proximity and geographical region-based 
homophily determine the formation of collaborative relations among IGOs. Contrary to my 
expectation, while being headquartered in the same geographical region is positively related 
to forming relationships among IGOs, the coefficient estimate is very small (0.09) and does 
not reach statistical significance. In addition to the role of being located in the same 
geographical region, the positive though weak coefficient may be attributed to the number of 
member states shared by IGO dyads. Given that IGOs are composed of and often act on 
behalf of their member states, and policy disagreements among members are viewed as 
causes of non-deployment or non-collaboration, it would be easier for the IGOs located in 
the same geographical region to forge consensus to form an alliance or partnership. Shared 
member states would presumably result in a convergence in IGOs’ preferences and policy 
decisions as well.16 
                                                
16 The model was also run with the number of shared member states each dyad possesses 
yet the model was degenerate, therefore, results with shared member states are not 
reported. 
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  In addition to geographical region-based homophily, I posited that proximity, captured 
by the real distance between headquarters of two organizations, would affect their 
collaboration decisions. The coefficient is weak but statistically significant; yet, contrary to my 
expectation, distance between two organizations’ headquarters is positively related to 
collaboration, suggesting that proximity, not geographical region-based homophily, may be a 
better predictor of IGO cooperation, especially given the results we have seen linking IGOs 
at extra-regional, regional and sub-regional levels. 
  Another explanation for this result might be that proliferation of regional and sub-
regional arrangements, particularly in Africa and Asia, in the last two decades, albeit initially 
viewed as a welcome development, led to dispersal of already scarce resources, 
contradiction of policies, competition and duplication of efforts (Tavares 2009), especially at 
sub-regional level. Regional and sub-regional IGOs, therefore, tend to team up with extra-
regional organizations rather than nearby IGOs due to reasons such as limited resources, 
“as witnessed particularly severely in the cases of AU in Darfur and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Hettne and 
Soderbaum 2006, 230).  
  Additionally, competition among regional organizations for organizational autonomy, 
institutional relevance and political influence threatens the viability of continental approaches 
to security and peace by duplicating efforts and fragmenting support, Franke (2007) notes, 
for instance, that although they have carried out operations on the ground in conflicts, e.g., 
the case of collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
in Mali and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central African 
Republic, and established a “Memoranda of Understanding,” the collaboration efforts among 
the AU and sub-regional organizations are often hindered by coordination gaps and intra-
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regional rivalries (Koops and Tardy 2015). If anything, though, the positive proximity 
coefficient further supports the findings in Table 3.2 regarding organizational type 
heterophily.17 
  Isolates have a pronounced effect on networks as well. As noted earlier, some IGOs 
are not always geared toward collaborating with others, presumably due to preserving their 
organizational identity and autonomy. Policy fragmentation among member states and 
disagreements between IGOs may hinder partnerships as well. The lack of collaboration 
between IGAD and the UN in Somalia is often attributed to the fragmented approach among 
member states as well as disagreement between IGAD and the UN with regard to the lifting 
of UN imposed arms embargo (Mays 2009). 
  Interestingly, prior bad experience variable that is operationalized as the number of 
casualties suffered by IGO dyads appears to positively affect whether IGOs are likely to 
repeat their collaboration. Although the relationship is statistically significant, it seems to 
have little effect on determining the likelihood of future collaborations between IGOs, as the 
coefficient estimate is very small. This positive coefficient is somewhat puzzling as it 
suggests that IGO dyads that have suffered heavy casualties, collectively, would be more 
likely to collaborate in the future. One possible explanation to note is that despite the 
consequence of the partnership, e.g., either a good or bad experience, prior collaborations 
would help IGOs to cultivate trustworthiness. On the one hand, even though the IGOs have 
become fatigued of failed operations, they would continue to partner with their prior 
collaborators, as it would provide them a chance to reflect on their failures. For example, 
                                                
17 This finding might also be driven by IGOs, e.g., NATO, which extended their geographic 
radiuses owing to the reasons sustaining their identities, and relevance as security 
organizations. In addition to operating in the territories of its member’s states and their 
immediate neighbors, NATO forces, for instance, deploy in “less ‘obvious’ areas such as 
Afghanistan and the Sudan” (Haugevik 2007, 9-10). 
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while misery of civil war in Balkans brought two strange bedfellows together as Smith-
Windsor (2011) puts it, the bad news (bad experience) that has been inflicted on them 
appears not to have stopped the UN and NATO to repeat or retain their collaboration in other 
conflict theaters around the world, Mali is a case in point. 
  On the other hand, given their varied capacities, lack of requisite financial and 
logistical capabilities, IGOs may have no choice but to cooperate even if their prior 
partnership was construed as a failure. For instance, although African and UN peacekeepers 
have suffered heavy casualties in Darfur, the collaboration between the UN and AU persist. 
The AU and UN have come to realize that they need each other’s support if they are to 
conduct an effective mission. While the UN provides the necessary financial resources, and 
capabilities, and legitimacy that a mission requires, the presence of the AU galvanizes local 
and regional support for the mission.   
Goodness of Fit Diagnostics and Model Degeneracy 
  In this part, I turn to goodness of fitness tests to assess whether my simulated model 
recovers observed networks. As Goodreau et al. (2009) note a sensible model specification 
for dyadic dependent processes may be problematic, and “a seemingly reasonable model 
may in fact have very counterintuitive implications” (Goodreau et al. 2009, 110).  
  ERG and TERG models often suffer from degeneracy problems. That is to say, in 
case that we specify a model that is unlikely to produce the observed network, either the 
estimations do not exist and estimations do not converge, i.e., produce no results, or the 
estimations do not afford a good fit to the modeled data (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). 
Degeneracy problems do not necessarily mean that the theory or intuitions about the 
process we model is wrong though and can indeed be overcome by specifying a better-fitting 
model for the data (Goodreau et al. 2009; Cranmer et al. 2012b).  
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Figure 3.1. Goodness of Fit Plots 
 
   
  As noted above, even if the estimations converge, and produce coefficient estimates, 
this does not necessarily mean that the model does not completely fit the data. Thus, I ran 
goodness of fit diagnostics to evaluate how well my model fits the observed graph of 
connections between participating organizations in each case. This procedure “compares 
structural statistics of the observed graph with the corresponding statistics on graphs 
simulated from the fitted model” (Hunter et al. 2008, 2). Figure 3.1 represents goodness of 
fitness plots, which compare the observed data to 10000 simulated networks for a given 
network statistic, such as triadic closure. The first plot represents the degree distribution, 
tabulated across all actors in the network (Goodreau et al. 2009), i.e., IGOs. The second plot 
shows the distribution of shared partners, namely number of the partners in common, 
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tabulated across all pairs of partners. The last plot represents the distribution of geodesic 
distance, which is the pairwise path distance between partners. Put differently, distance 
between partners is “1”, and it is “2” between partners of partners who are not partners 
directly—indirect ties (Goodreau 2009). 
  In all plots, the vertical axis is the logit of relative frequency, the solid lines represent 
the model statistics, and the boxplots include the interquartile range and the median, and 
gray bands capture 95% confidence intervals (Hunter et al. 2008). As it is shown in Figure 
3.1, represented by edge-wise shared partners plot, even though the model to some extent 
underestimates the observed number of shared partners, it overall recovers the underlying 
data well (as indicated by the solid line between 95% confidence interval bands). The plot 
then suggests that the model captures aspects of the social structure of the IGO networks 
conducting peace operations and social processes that induce IGOs to collaborate.  
Conclusion 
  This chapter has shed light on several aspects and factors of partnership formation 
among IGOs in peace operations. I argued, and the data have largely shown, that along with 
exogenous covariates, the structure of interdependencies in general, and the effect of triadic 
closure in particular, may be the underlying motives for inter-organizational collaborations on 
the ground in peace operations. In other words, contrary to previous studies on the subject 
(Balas 2011b), this chapter shows that incorporating endogenous interdependence 
structures, such as triadic closure, is essential to the formation of IGO networks. Another 
important finding is that after accounting for structural interdependencies, such as friend-of-
a-friend triadic closure, or the structure of a network in a previous time point, some of the 
previously studied and reported determinants (Balas 2011b) of IGO network formation, such 
as shared organizational function, drop out of statistical significance. 
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  The next chapter will discuss the role of these IGO networks, their structural 
properties, such as centralizations, and composition, e.g., organizational function homophily, 
in affecting the peace operations’ performance in implementing their core goals. 
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CHAPTER 4 THEORY AND EMPIRICS IN THE STUDY OF PEACE OPERATIONS 
SUCCESS 
 
Introduction 
  The November 16th, 2006, High-Level Consultations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
concluded with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) 
decision to supplement the existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and to deploy an 
“unprecedented” joint and hybrid peace mission (un.org). Though the African Union (AU) and 
United Nations (UN) hybrid mission (UNAMID) is unprecedented in that it is the first hybrid 
mission 18  deployed by two intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), it is hardly 
unprecedented that two or more IGOs would undertake collaborative efforts in carrying out 
peace operations in the field. Indeed, due to a variety of peace challenges—particularly after 
the Cold War and the related rise of ethnic, sectarian intrastate wars—collaborative efforts 
between IGOs in conducting peace operations have become increasingly common 
(Talentino 2005; Williams 2013).  
  To that end, the UN, for instance, began to reform its peacekeeping doctrine and its 
relations with regional and sub-regional organizations. In a similar way, in order to share the 
burden of peace operations in a coordinated manner, the UN began to develop a process of 
multilateral dialogue with regional and sub-regional organizations (Felicio 2009) because of 
the view that success in peace operations demands calibration and coordination of efforts 
across a wide range of contexts between the organizations, nation states, and local 
authorities involved. 
                                                
18 Different from other collaborative peace operations, UNAMID was planned as a joint inter-
organizational mission with one command structure. It was designed that the hybrid mission 
would be lead by the AU and formed by African troops while the UN would provide capacities 
such as funding, equipment, as well as logistics (Pelz and Lehmann 2007). 
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  As expressed in the introductory chapter, various actors are engaged in various 
peace operation activities. Overlapping mandates and complex partnerships are becoming a 
common feature of peace operations. Yet, despite their growing importance for the future of 
peace missions and their outcomes, the specific topic of inter-organizational relations in 
peace operations remains largely uncharted. And thus, as Bellamy and Williams (2013) point 
out, taking these partnerships and collaborative efforts into consideration in evaluating peace 
operations is one of the key challenges for future research. Understanding the role of 
collaborative efforts among IGOs in peace operations is important for several reasons. 
Perhaps most critically, an understanding of peace operation outcomes is incomplete and 
probably flawed without an appreciation of the role of IGOs and the interactions between 
them.  
  Although scholars have underscored that collaboration among IGOs and the pooling 
of resources are crucial for the success of peace operations (Koops and Tardy 2015; Balas 
2011a), there have been few systematic efforts to examine how and why an inter-
organizational network (IGO network), which “consists of all of the organizations linked by a 
specific type of relation and is constructed by finding the ties between all the organizations” 
(Aldrich 1979, 281), might be essential to peace operation performance. My approach, 
therefore, is consistent with recent calls to study the role of inter-organizational collaborative 
efforts and partnerships in peace operations, and more specifically, the effect of their 
structural features and composition on peace operations’ performance in achieving their core 
goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. In other words, this 
dissertation research adds theoretical literature on peace operations by empirically analyzing 
the possible relationship between cohesion (denoted as density), and structure (i.e. 
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centralization) of inter-organizational networks and their composition and the success and 
failure of peace operations. 
  Building on previous chapters discussing the collaborative efforts among IGOs and 
the structural properties of the networks they form, this chapter seeks to determine what 
effect the structure of inter-organizational networks has on peace operation performance. 
Thus I address this specific question: How do the composition and structure of inter-
organizational networks affect the success and failure of peace operations in implementing 
their core goals? References to the salience of inter-organizational networks for 
organizational performance and outcomes, such as solving collective action problems, are 
not uncommon, yet there is no study, to the best of my knowledge, that focuses on the role 
and effect of IGO networks’ composition and structure in the performance of peace 
operations.  
  This chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section, I briefly review the 
literature on inter-organizational collaboration and the success and failure of peace 
operations. I conclude by introducing my hypotheses and specifying the ways I will analyze 
network effects on outcomes. 
The Literature on Peace Operations 
  Fortna and Howard (2008) suggest that the literature on peacekeeping “has come in 
one small and two big waves” (Fortna and Howard 2008, 284). The first wave of studies 
during the Cold War mostly dealt with peacekeeping in interstate wars. The second wave of 
studies after the end of Cold War focused primarily on failures of peacekeeping such as the 
missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, notwithstanding important cases of successes, 
e.g., Mozambique, and Guatemala. Even though the studies of first and second waves have 
concentrated on descriptions and policy prescriptions, third wave has dealt with “systematic 
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and methodologically rigorous analysis (both quantitatively and qualitatively) of basic 
empirical questions about the effects of peacekeeping and the sources of peacekeeping 
outcomes” (Fortna and Howard 2008, 283). Many studies in that school of thought have 
noted that peacekeeping is effective in maintenance of international peace and security 
(Haas 1986; Fortna 2004b); yet few of these studies have examined the factors that might 
account for effectiveness of these missions. 
  In the past few years, the literature on peace operations shifted its focus to any 
variation between failures and successes, but empirical analysis of the causes of 
peacekeeping outcomes has been less conclusive (Fortna and Howard 2008) and many 
questions such as which organizations, e.g., pairs of organizations, regional organizations, 
or the UN, are most effective in keeping peace and how their collaborative efforts might 
account for peace operations’ performance still linger. 
Determinants of Success/Failure in Peace Operations 
  Many studies have documented the effects of peace operations on conflict 
management and resolution. The historical record in peace operations indicates that there 
have been conspicuous successes and failures, which have been affected by various 
factors. How much of the outcome can be attributed to the peace operation itself given, for 
example, that peacekeepers are often sent to the most difficult conflicts (Melander 2009; 
Diehl 2008)? On the one hand, “it might be too much to expect those missions to make a 
significant difference in the behavior of implacable enemies” (Diehl 2008, 125). On the other 
hand, there are many factors beyond the control of the peace operations that can account for 
a mission’s success or failure (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; 
MacQueen 2008; Diehl 2008). Diehl (2008) puts factors that might affect the success and 
failure of peace operations into three categories: operational, contextual and behavioral. 
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Operational factors are the ones under the control of peacekeepers such as how the 
operation is organized and executed. Contextual factors are associated with the conflict 
environment, which are not potentially under the control of peace operations. And, 
behavioral factors—reactions of key actors in the conflict—are important in determining the 
success or failure of peace missions as well, Diehl (2008) notes. 
  Operational factors focus on organizational characteristics of the mission that might 
lead to success or failure. Mandates of operations, resources available to peacekeepers, 
and coordination among the main actors and stakeholders are often cited as critical factors 
that determine if an operation would succeed in accomplishing its goals. Although there is no 
guarantee of success in UN peace operations, for Guehenno (2002), they can be better 
managed provided that resources match the needs of the mission and mandates (Urquhart 
1987; Guehenno 2002). In line with Guehenno’s argument concerning reasons for failure in 
peace missions, O’Shea (2002) contends that weak mandates, insufficient training of forces, 
inadequate resources (Malaquias 1996; Jett 2000), and mismanagement on the ground are 
likely to contribute to the failure of operations.  
  As another operational factor, for Bellamy and Williams (2005), legitimacy of a peace 
operation is crucial in accounting for effectiveness, and thus, success of a mission. Should 
an operation be perceived as illegitimate by the international society, it cannot provide 
international peace and security since its outcome will not be granted international validation, 
and because it will not garner the support of local population. Furthermore, a mission should 
be regarded as impartial since otherwise IGO(s) conducting the operation will be viewed as a 
party to the conflict, and thereby the operation will lose its legitimacy, the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is a case in point (Evans 1993). Moreover, the perceived 
legitimacy of an operation might erode over time; thus, it is suggested that when capable and 
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legitimate government structures emerge in the country where the operation was deployed, 
the role played by peacekeepers should diminish. Additionally, international actors should 
promote “national and local ownership, in order to contribute to the achievement of a 
sustainable peace” (UN Peacekeeping Operations 2008, 37). 
  In addition to operational factors that may inhibit or contribute to success, contextual 
factors, i.e., circumstances of the conflict, including presence of domestic institutions, such 
as financial institutions, (Paris 1997; Manwaring and Fishel 1998; Day and Freeman 2003), 
healthy economy and adequate resources (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), a long history of 
dispute (Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2004b), organized crime (Shaw and Kemp 2012; 
Kemp et al. 2013), and geographic configuration of the conflict (Diehl 1994) might affect the 
success and failure of a given mission. The presence of reliable domestic institutions in 
target country is also crucial for peace to persist. Manwaring and Fishel (1998) point out that 
“post-conflict military security and economic development cannot be sustained once 
peacekeepers depart unless there is left behind in national institutions the basic ‘political 
competence’ needed to deliver continuing security, growth, and other essential public 
services” (As cited in Durch and Berkman 2006, 17). As Doyle and Sambanis (2006) assert, 
in ethnically divided societies, provided that the elections, electoral rules, or institutions 
support or reward one group, this would encourage hate speech, the formation of ethnically 
driven political parties, which would undermine the stable peace in the long run (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006). To illustrate, IFOR efforts in Bosnia have prevented the resumption of the 
civil war, yet “broader peacebuilding, e.g., repatriation of refugees has been stifled by 
elections that have handed power to ethnically polarized parties” (Diehl 2008, 140). For 
Fortna (2004a, 2004b, 2008), ethnic conflicts are more likely to resume after the withdrawal 
of peacekeepers. Additionally, if the conflict has a long history of militarized disputes, the 
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fighting even during the presence of peacekeepers is more likely to reignite (Fortna 2003, 
2004a, 2008). 
  Finally, behavior of actors, “those directly involved as well as third parties” (Diehl 
2008, 142), might account for the success/failure of peace operations. For instance, the 
number of parties to the conflict along with other factors would affect an operation’s 
outcome. The larger the number of parties involved in conflict, the more difficult to reach a 
settlement, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) suggest. The lack of commitment and will by major 
powers to stop the violence also undermine the chance of success (Jett 2000). In a 
somewhat similar vein, for Downs and Stedman (2002), even though support of great 
powers in peace operations might not be a factor that ensures the success of a mission, its 
absence in intractable conflicts (hard cases) guarantees the failure of the mission. 
Furthermore, the presence of the external support for belligerents, for Pushkina (2006), is a 
crucial factor that affects the operation outcome. Supply of any type of assistance to 
belligerents would limit the peacekeepers ability to stop violence, thus will undermine the 
success (Evans 1993; Pushkina 2004; Pushkina 2006), and presumably prolong the conflict. 
  In addition to major powers, and third-party states, sub-national or transnational 
actors might account for effectiveness of an operation. To illustrate, organized crime in 
conflict zones has undermined the attempts of international community to tackle the 
problems of instability and violence, and has become a major threat to peace operations 
(Shaw and Kemp 2012; Kemp et al. 2013). Criminal groups or terrorist organizations may 
disrupt peace processes by teaming up with spoilers, armed groups, and paramilitaries as in 
Mali and Somalia (Kemp et al. 2013). Hence as the Brahimi Report (2000) highlighted, “the 
United Nations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers if it expects to achieve a 
consistent record of success in intrastate/transnational conflicts.” 
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  Above studies produced sophisticated analyses of factors affecting the performance 
of peace operations, particularly in achieving their core goals. Yet, inter-organizational 
networking among IGOs in peace operations as a factor of success/failure has not been 
studied, and might contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of peace operations’ 
performance.  
Effects of IGO Networks on Peace Operations Outcomes  
Structural Properties of IGO Networks and Peace Operations Performance 
  Structure matters. System level analysis is one of the main principles of neorealist 
paradigm in international relations. The structure of the international system, i.e., anarchy, 
does affect the behavior of states (units), and policy outcomes, neorealists suggest (Waltz 
1979; Mearsheimer 1995). The international system restricts some actions of units, as well 
as influences the outcomes of unit interaction (Waltz 1979), e.g., the outcome of inter-
organizational collaboration and cooperation in peace operations. In line with discussions 
regarding the role of structure in explaining the state and IGO behavior in international 
system, one of the main tenets of network analysis is the “idea that the structure of relations 
among actors has certain consequences, regardless of the level of analysis” (Mizruchi 2014, 
200). Therefore, one should analyze not only the interactions among units but also the 
causal effects of structure on unit interaction (Biermann 2008). 
  Further, a good network theory should “propose how structures of interactions enable 
coordinated interaction to achieve collective and individual interests” (Salancik 1995, 348). 
Though there is no consensus on in what ways structural characteristics and the composition 
of a network may affect its performance, network centralization and density are viewed as 
the main factors that have a moderating effect on network effectiveness (Provan and Milward 
1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Gulati and Singh 1998). 
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  Inter-organizational networks in peace operations represent a form of collective action 
providing global peace and security, which are akin to public goods. In the international 
system, there is no mechanism to compel states or organizations to participate; thus peace 
operations are “vulnerable to ‘free-riding’” (Diehl 2008, 89; Balas 2011b)—reaping the 
“benefits of a collective good provided by the contributors of other group members while 
paying none of the price” (Marwell et al. 1988, 504)—by IGOs and states. For instance, 
studies applying collective action theories to peacekeeping operations by North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN (Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Dantiki 2005) 
document that costs of operations, such as troops expense, are shared by a handful of 
states while others free ride.  
  Collective action theorists contend “overcoming the free-rider problem requires 
organizing potential contributors, thus making their decisions interdependent” (Marwell et al. 
1988, 502). That is to say, actors, e.g., organizations, or individuals, decide to contribute to 
collective action based on how much others have already contributed or would contribute 
(Oliver et al. 1985). 
  In the field, IGOs carry out tasks ranging from organizing relief agencies, and various 
military units to collaborating with other international organizations and local entities. Given 
“the absence of an inter-organizational infrastructure of authority all entities acknowledge” 
(Roberts and Bradley 2005, 112), at the operational level, IGOs develop personal and 
professional relationships with other IGOs on ad hoc basis establishing “complex webs of 
relations” (Roberts and Bradley 2005, 112). These complex webs of relations operate with 
complete organizational independence that leads to a “coordination nightmare” (Martin 2000) 
(As cited in Roberts and Bradley 2005), which would ultimately hamper efficiency of peace 
operations.  
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Figure 4.1. Centralization and Density Illustrations 
 
  Given this context, Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest that a clear leadership of a focal 
organization that affords the alliance with cohesion and guidance is sine qua non of a stable 
alliance and partnership. Central actors enable the implementation of tasks within networks 
(Eade 1997; Atouba and Shumate 2010) and enhance the level of cooperation (Alter 1990). 
That is to say, these central actors act as a coordinating body for unlinked actors, who make 
small contributions to the public good, yet benefit from it. Central organizations, furthermore, 
“translate and coordinate smaller contributions of such organizations into effective collective 
action in order to achieve a public good” (Atouba and Shumate 2010, 298).                                          
  The actors central to the network—as demonstrated in Figure 4.1—manage 
interactions and transactions within the network (Biermann 2008) and provide the forum for 
meeting and sharing information. Because this forum is convened around an overall 
implementation plan, “encompassing all the mandated tasks in a mission, and jointly agreed 
upon by the different stakeholders in the field” (Derblom et al. 2008, 64), it will preclude 
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mandate overlap and harmonize directions from different offices (Derblom et al. 2008) as 
well as synchronize efforts by other IGOs. In this regard, centralized networks will further 
encourage collaborative efforts among IGOs, and be more effective in their coordination and 
collaboration efforts, subsequently bringing the network as a whole to success (O’Toole 
1996). Following this logic, Alagappa (1999) asserts that in peace operations, the Security 
Council must have the ultimate responsibility and political control, while all other 
responsibilities may be shared among other IGOs. Should there is an ambiguity in the 
control and leadership of the operation, not only the success of the operation will be 
hampered but also tensions between institutions will be exasperated, the chain of command 
will be complicated, thus coordination and accountability problems will arise (Alagappa 1999, 
290). Similarly, Harsch and Varwick (2009) point out that the UN has the legitimacy, potential 
and authority to become the central coordinating body in peace operations, and thus, the 
UN’s central role would “help to streamline international actions and facilitate resolving ‘turf 
wars’ between the actors involved” (Harsch and Varwick 2009, 35). 
  Studies on collective action dilemmas suggest that not only the network 
centralization, but also density of the network, which denotes the extensiveness of ties 
between network members (Aldrich and Whetten 1981), is associated with the effectiveness 
of collective action. Though prior studies on network effectiveness note that network density 
facilitates collective action (Tilly 1978), contrary to the conventional wisdom, the empirical 
research on the relationship between density and collective action has found mixed 
outcomes. 
  Marwell et al. (1988), for instance, have noted that density of the network extends the 
reach of an organizer, and thus helps to promote greater contribution by network actors. In a 
similar vein, echoing Axelrod’s discussion that cooperation cannot occur if it is “tried only by 
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scattered individuals who have no chance to interact with each other” (Axelrod 1984, 68), 
Kim and Bearman (1997) note that dense ties among members of the network enhance 
commitment, which in turn promote successful collective action. More precisely, their 
findings reveal that if network density is close to zero (a sparse network, which mostly is 
comprised of isolates), actors contribute to collective good solely based on their individual 
considerations, and granted the absence of social ties; collective action would not be 
successful (Kim 1995). On the contrary, should network density “approaches saturation (i.e., 
density above .5), the ‘local’ boundary of rationality’ becomes globalized and no transaction 
cost accrues to interpersonal interactions, including information exchange” (Kim and 
Bearman 1997, 88). By the same token, in dense networks, “contributions result from greatly 
enhanced ‘group efficacy,’ and successful collective action is the norm, not the exception” 
(Kim and Bearman 1997, 88). In a nutshell, increasing interaction among network actors is 
decisive in accounting for the success of collective action (Kim and Bearman 1997) since 
actors in densely knit networks, as shown in 4.1, high- density illustration, are better able to 
address and solve credibility and coordination problems that arise from collaborative 
projects, e.g., peace missions. 
  In conjunction with these theories, Mizruchi (2014) notes that in order for 
organizations to engage in collective action and achieve a certain degree of success in 
accomplishing their collective goals, unity and a certain level of cohesion among network 
members is required (Also see Worchel et al. 1991). Some empirical support for this 
hypothesis is provided by McCubbins et al. (2009), who found that increase in the 
connectivity of the networks they studied led to greater coordination and faster solutions in 
resolving collective action problems. Therefore, it appears that “a cohesive group will exhibit 
successful task performance” (Mullen and Copper 1994, 210) as opposed to a loosely 
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connected network. Applying this logic to inter-organizational coordination during peace 
operations, scholars suggest that the level of cohesion during Liberian peace operations has 
helped IGOs to carry out a wide range of tasks and operations from peacekeeping to peace 
enforcement (Olonisakin 2000) and contribute to their success in abating violence and 
settling the conflict, which would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement without 
collaborative efforts. 
  Additionally, the smooth operation of a system, e.g., an IGO network, has long been 
recognized as being achieved by improving coordination among network actors through a 
greater degree of cohesiveness (Anderson 1978). Likewise social capital perspective 
(Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995) suggests that actors in dense networks with overlapping links 
are more likely to collaborate, and thereby enhance coordination in the resolution of 
collection action problems. It is because groups, organizations or individuals operate in 
densely knit networks are better able to solve credibility problems, which arise from 
collaborative projects (Scholz et al. 2008), e.g., peace operations.  
  These collaborative networks are often dynamic, and hence, over time, these dense 
clustered networks might cultivate shared interests, beliefs, norms and values capable of 
fostering a wide range of activity and expand the tie formation among other network actors 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  
  Density also enhances legitimacy (Provan and Kenis, 2007). Thus, forming dense 
networks may be particularly critical in implementing conflict settlement and conflict 
containment of peace operations as belligerents often view the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers obstructing their political ambitions (Adebajo 2011). In this sense, participation 
of regional and sub-regional IGOs along with the UN forces may facilitate negotiating a 
peace agreement since it would be seen as more inclusive and fair. For instance, organizing 
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several conferences and bridging together representatives from conflict parties, regional 
leaders from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) contributed to 
peacemaking and conflict settlement efforts in Sudan (Adebajo 2001). Similarly, African 
states valued the involvement of the AU as a multilateral expression “of a general ‘African’ 
will over the case of Darfur” (Gelot 2012, 71). 
  Similar to centralized networks, dense relations will lessen transaction and 
enforcement costs attributed to credibility problems that arise from collective action 
dilemmas since actors part of a dense network will be more willing to engage in 
collaboration. Further, echoing Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) study, Scholz et al. 
(2008) point out that beliefs and attitudes in dense networks are expected to converge over 
time, which will presumably facilitate future collaboration.  
  Yet, in contrast to above cited studies, Macy (1991a) reported that a dense network 
hampers collective action since in dense networks actors cannot differentiate between 
cooperators and defectors (Macy 1991a), and thus, density is not a condition for effective 
cooperation. In fact, if collaborative efforts are to be effective, forming loosely connected, 
sparse networks, with diverse set of actors, should be preferred over high-density networks 
(Mullen and Copper 1994).  
  These arguments can be restated as the following empirical implications: 
  Hypothesis 1a: Centralized IGO networks are more likely to be successful (than 
decentralized IGO networks) in abating violence. 
  Hypothesis 1b: Centralized IGO networks are more likely to be successful (than 
decentralized IGO networks) in containing conflict. 
  Hypothesis 1c: Centralized IGO networks are more likely to be successful (than 
decentralized IGO networks) in conflict settlement. 
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  Hypothesis 2a: The higher IGO network’s density, the more likely peace operations 
will be successful in violence abatement. 
  Hypothesis 2b: The higher IGO network’s density, the more likely peace operations 
will be successful in conflict containment. 
  Hypothesis 2c: The higher IGO network’s density, the more likely peace operations 
will be successful in conflict settlement.  
Composition of IGO Networks and Peace Operations Performance  
  Diminishing the risks of collaborative failures or maximizing the success of 
collaborative efforts, as expressed earlier, has become an increasingly important goal for 
IGOs. This has been particularly important due to increasing salience of partnerships for 
organizational survival and global problem solving (Atouba and Shumate 2015). Studies on 
inter-organizational collaborations note that not only the structural characteristics of a given 
network, i.e., its centralization and density, but also its composition, whether characterized 
by organizations sharing the same organizational characteristics, is critical for effectiveness 
of collective action solutions (McPherson et al. 2001). 
  Theories of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; Ibarra 1992: McPherson et al. 
2001), for instance, note that actors are more likely to form ties with the ones with whom they 
are likely to identify themselves. Scholars contend that dense connections form among the 
actors that share a common purpose, values, cultures and shared interests (Gibbons 2007). 
But how would homophily and organizational attributes account for effectiveness of IGO 
networks?  
  It is unlikely that the question posed has a straightforward answer. For instance, in 
contrast to Olson (1965), who suggests that group heterogeneity, e.g., type of actors, the 
degree of resources available to them, and their organizational function, is favorable to 
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collective action, Macy (1991b) notes that heterogeneity is not a necessary condition for 
generating collective action, yet it may explain why actors opt out, or are reluctant to 
contribute to collaborations since they may not get along with the ones that are not similar to 
them. In a similar vein, others argue that collective action problems, such as peace 
operations, in which the partners commit unequally have a higher failure rate, since the 
organization that “commits at a lower level will deliver insufficient effort and resources to the 
partnership” (Shumate et al. 2005, 490). Peace operations suffer from unequal burden-
sharing (Mancini 2011) due to the lack of commitment and engagement by actors (Morris 
2010), which are driven by the lack of bureaucratic, logistical and financial capabilities of 
collaboration partners. Similarly, “varying degrees of commitment to UN missions reduce the 
clarity of tasks and aims of peace operation mandates,” Junk (2012, 250) suggests. 
Regardless of the reasons of unequal commitment and partnerships, inequities would curb 
the success of missions (Boutellis and Williams 2013).  
  IGOs must have the required resources and capabilities to achieve peace operations’ 
objectives, such as reducing violence, containing and settling conflict in which the countries 
they are deployed. Though the UN has been the predominant peacekeeper in many conflicts 
and maintains the majority of peacekeepers in operations, regional and sub-regional 
organizations have increased the tempo of their missions. The AU, for instance, has hugely 
increased its engagement in African conflicts to operationalize its new principle of “non-
indifference” (Williams 2013, 2). Yet, as often noted, these organizations notably the African 
IGOs do not have capabilities and resources to undertake these missions on their own. IGOs 
with high capacity, e.g., the European Union (EU), therefore launch capacity building 
initiatives in Africa to strengthen basic institutional capacities and efficiency of the AU and 
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other regional and sub-regional organizations in the conduct and planning of peace 
operations.  
  As an example, with regard to the EU-AU-UN collaboration, there are structural 
imbalances due to the fact that these organizations are unequal entities in term of their 
organizational capacities, which might curb the coordination among them, and thereby 
effectiveness of their missions. As compared to the UN and the EU, the AU is a young 
organization with limited capabilities and scarce resources. In this regard, in dyads of the UN 
and AU, and the EU and AU, there seems to be an “imbalance for finding equal counterparts 
for dialogue” (Derblom et al. 2008, 65), thus the coordination between the UN-EU is 
expected to be more effective as compared to the other possible dyads constructed from 
these organizations (Derblom et al. 2008). Similarly, the AU’s lack of institutional capacity 
hampers inter-organizational cooperation with the EU. Being understaffed and having scarce 
resources, the AU could not handle the workload and accordingly “the organization’s 
absorption capacity for international support measures has declined” (Franke 2009, 70).  
  In addition to resource imbalance, the network literature emphasizes the role of 
organizational function, culture and values in accounting for formation and maintenance of 
collaborative relations, and generating effective collective action accordingly. There is no 
agreement in the literature on how organizational function homophily might influence the 
performance of IGO networks, nonetheless. On the one hand, some suggest that differences 
in organizational functions and culture might account for coordination problems and limit 
harmonization and efficiency of operations. In this perspective, analysts note that networks 
operate effectively when actors voluntarily behave as if they are all part of a broader 
organization sharing common values and cultures. This sense of community may be easier 
to instill in an intra-organizational network, where assets are held by a single actor, than in a 
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dynamic inter-organizational network, where assets are spread across changeable 
combinations of actors. However, in either case, the network must create an organization 
“culture” that transcends ownership and national borders (Snow et al. 1992) to perform 
effectively. To that end, it is advised that shared roles and identities are established among 
network actors so that they can orient themselves toward one another, and mobilize 
collective action quickly and effectively (Friedrich 2014). To illustrate, it is often noted that 
being a military actor, NATO has been reluctant to coordinate with non-military actors, e.g., 
the UN. It is mostly because first, NATO is less aware of civilian dimensions of conflict and 
crises management. And second, the organization does not want to be coordinated by other 
organizations, such as the EU (Major and Molling 2009).  
  On the other hand, others, such as Provan and Kenis (2007) point out that 
instrumental reasons, e.g. goal similarity between network partners, rather than 
organizational similarity or attractiveness, have more important implications for the formation 
inter-organizational networks and their performance. Collaboration requires a certain degree 
of consensus regarding the goals that organizations set in order them to engage in collective 
action (Provan and Kenis 2007). On the contrary, Park (1996) notes that similarity of goals 
might lead to competitiveness among network partners resulting in difficulties, including lack 
of cooperation and information exchange, thus hampers effective coordination and 
collaboration.  
  Coordination problems, which derive from the status incongruity, indeed can be 
overcome by collaboration and cooperation among IGOs. Learning through collaboration and 
exchange of information in inter-organizational networks creates the process of 
organizations becoming similar in design and functioning: “institutional isomorphism” and 
“epistemic isomorphism” which is the tendency of organizational convergence owing to the 
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norms or experiences shared by organizations’ staff and leaders, and shared epistemic 
values (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
  In inter-organizational collaboration context, it can be assumed that the more 
organizations learn from each other, and the more similar they become in their conduct of 
operations; cooperation and coordination will be easier (Lorange and Ross 1992; Koops 
2008). For instance, after the Cold War the Euro-Atlantic security institutions have been 
transforming into a risk oriented security management institutions, similar to NATO 
(Wallender and Keohane 1999). While “NATO had Cold War assets it could simply 
rededicate towards ‘peace support operations,’ the EU had to create a plethora of new 
bodies which bear a remarkable similarity to the corresponding NATO bodies” (Biermann 
2008, 172) to facilitate the cooperation and coordination between these two organizations. 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU, for example, resembles the NATO 
Council, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) is similar to NATO’s Military Committee 
(Biermann 2008). Organizational similarity, as noted earlier, is likely to translate into better 
coordination, and cohesion, which would engender effectiveness in implementing peace 
operations’ core goals. 
  In light of these theories, I articulate the importance of network composition in 
affecting the performance of peace operations, and hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Collaborations among IGOs having same level of resource capacity 
are more likely to be successful in violence abatement.19 
Hypothesis 3b: Collaborations among IGOs having same level of resource capacity 
are more likely to be successful in conflict containment.  
                                                
19 Regardless of the level of resource capacity, it is expected that IGO networks with the 
same level of resource capacity would be more successful. 
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Hypothesis 3c: Collaborations among IGOs having same level of resource capacity 
are more likely to be successful in conflict settlement.  
Hypothesis 4a: Collaborations among IGOs sharing same organizational function are 
more likely to be successful in abating violence. 
Hypothesis 4b: Collaborations among IGOs sharing same organizational function are 
more likely to be successful in containing conflict. 
Hypothesis 4c: Collaborations among IGOs sharing same organizational function are 
more likely to be successful in settling conflict. 
Conflict and Conflict Country Characteristics  
  The broad consensus in the conflict management and resolution literature is that the 
outcome of peace processes and operations will be determined by the characteristics of host 
country and the conflict itself (Heldt 2001, Diehl and Druckman 2009; Koko and Essis 2012). 
Diehl and Druckman (2009) note that context of peace operations vary depending on the 
country and conflict in which they are deployed. I will address and control for the variables 
that are mostly studied in the research literature. 
  As expressed earlier, the target country in which peace missions are launched and 
conflict characteristics can play an important role in accounting for peace operation 
outcomes. The next set of hypotheses I lay out therefore focus on those conflict and country 
characteristics. Among the factors that may affect peace operations outcomes, scholars 
highlight the factors associated with the conflict characteristics, such as conflict intensity and 
conflict issues, and conflict country attributes, e.g., country size, local capacities, and ethnic 
fractionalization of the country in which peace missions are carried out. 
  Though literature on conflict management and peace operations suggests that 
conflict intensity is one of the determinants of conflict peace operations success, there is little 
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agreement over whether the conflict intensity is positively or negatively related with peace 
operations performance. Although some scholars suggest that conflict intensity is negatively 
correlated with the conflict management success, particularly with regard to conflict 
settlement, as it makes bargaining more difficult due to polarization between the conflict 
parties (Kleiboer 1996; Jackson 2000; Koko and Essis 2012), “by evaluating conflict intensity 
in terms of fatalities experienced by each adversary” (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 13), others find 
that conflict management success is positively correlated with intensity of a conflict 
(Bercovitch et al. 1991). In line with Jackson (2000), Diehl and Druckman (2009) point out 
that parties to the conflict are less inclined to grant concessions and reconcile with their 
enemies if the conflicts are more serious, i.e., high intensity. The chances of peace operation 
success, particularly with regard to conflict settlement, should diminish with increasing 
casualties since this would generate resentment and harden feelings of enmity between 
conflict actors. 
  Conflict management literature also finds a strong relationship between the issues for 
which conflicts are waged and peace operations’ outcome. Conflict issues are often 
categorized as the ones related to tangible issues which refers to control over territory, and 
intangible issues, such as disagreements between conflict parties over ideological issues, 
including government type (Jackson 2000). Scholarly view on the subject holds that 
disagreements over territorial issues and threats to territorial integrity are an important 
condition for the onset of armed conflict (Heldt 2001). Furthermore, territorial issues “have 
perceived value based on long-standing religious, historical, or ethnic connections (e.g., 
Jerusalem or Kosovo)” (Diehl and Druckman 2009, 13), and thus, they often have an 
emotional appeal to a certain group. As compared to conflicts over ideological 
disagreements, conflicts over territorial issues, therefore, are hard to negotiate and 
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compromise with a narrow “bargaining space” (Diehl and Druckman 2009). Additionally, 
Stedman et al. (2002) suggest that even if conflict over territorial disagreements result in 
peace agreements, they have limited prospects for lasting peace.  
  In addition to conflict characteristics’ impact on peace operation outcome, part of the 
conflict context that determines peace operation’s success is the characteristics of the 
conflict country in which peace operations are deployed. For instance, a peace operation’s 
success, particularly with regard to violence abatement and conflict containment, might be 
jeopardized by the size of territory that peacekeepers have to control. In most of conflict 
environments, there are several groups operating in different parts of the county and 
provided that peacekeepers have to cover a broad and large territory, they are likely to 
become targets of spoilers that would “open up the possibility of more violent incidents” 
(Diehl and Druckman 2009, 10) mitigating the odds of success. Reducing the geographic 
scope of the conflict will shrink the areas that are needed to be monitored during a ceasefire 
as well; therefore, “peacekeepers will be better able to detect violations and assign 
responsibility for violent actions, which will have deterrent effect on potential spoilers” (Diehl 
and Druckman 2010, 192). 
  The possible role of ethnic fractionalization on conflict has received considerable 
attention in the conflict management literature as well. Though empirical studies on the 
subject found no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and onset of civil wars, this 
result is often attributed to the classification of ethnic groups in the Atlas Nadarov Mira 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), the widely used ethnic fractionalization dataset. In his 
seminal work, Horowitz (1985) notes that there is a nonmonotic relationship between conflict 
and ethnic fractionalization. Countries that are ethnically homogeneous or heterogenous are 
less prone to armed conflicts as compared to the ones that an ethnic minority faces an ethnic 
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majority, Horowitz (1985) suggests.  Thus, as it would be more difficult to recruit members 
and sustain the unity of rebel forces and organizational cohesion in multiethnic societies 
(Collier 2001; Heldt 2002), peace operations deployed in ethnically polarized societies would 
be less likely to contain grievances that stem from ethnic tensions. 
  The success of peace operations, particularly peacebuilding missions to a large 
extent, depends on the extent of local capacities in the host state (Doyle and Sambanis 
2006; Diehl and Druckman 2009). I use GDP per capita as a proxy for indicating local 
capacity. The more local capacity with regard to per capita GDP is available, “the shorter the 
distance to goal achievement and the easier to the road to travel to reach that goal” Diehl 
and Druckman (2009, 19) note.  
Conclusion 
  This chapter provided a theoretical framework to assess and explore the factors that 
may account for peace operation successes and failures and laid out a series of hypotheses 
on how IGO networks, their structural characteristics, e.g., centralization, and composition, 
such as organizational function homophily, might influence success in peace operations. 
Additionally, I discussed the role of conflict and host country characteristics in affecting the 
success of peace operations. The following chapter will present my research design, and 
introduce dependent and independent variables. And it will investigate two prominent 
features of IGO networks, i.e., centralization and density, and discuss my findings regarding 
how IGO networks, their structure and composition are associated with peace operations’ 
performance in implementing their core goals.  
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CHAPTER 5 COLLABORATING FOR PEACE? IGO NETWORKS and PEACE 
OPERATION PERFORMANCE  
 
Introduction 
  This chapter examines the effect of inter-organizational networks’ structural 
properties, more specifically density and centralization, and composition, on the success and 
failure of peace operations. In order to explore the questions raised and hypotheses laid out 
in previous chapter, quantitative approaches are utilized and they are supplemented with 
qualitative examples. My discussion below outlines a broader set of conditions and is meant 
to apply to a variety of conflict scenarios into which a peace operation might be deployed.  
Research Design 
Data and Measures 
  I use measures drawn from social network analysis to test the possible relationship 
between IGO networks engaged in peace operations and outcomes of these missions. The 
hypotheses I laid out in previous chapter (Chapter 4) are tested on a new dataset with a 
temporal domain of 1990-2013, and a global spatial domain. The unit of analysis is the 
conflict-network-year. I examine inter-organizational IGO networks engaged in peace 
operations in each internal armed conflict20 between 1990-2013. The number of observations 
is 174. Due to time-series cross-sectional nature of my data with binary dependent variables, 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate. Following Beck et al. (1998), I 
account for temporal dependence in the binary outcome time-series cross-sectional data 
with natural cubic splines. That is, I run logistic regression with cubic splines. Along with my 
dependent variables—success variables—some of my variables, including the network 
                                                
20 I use the definition of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/the Peace Research Institute 
Uppsala (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset’s definition of armed conflict, which is the use 
of force between two parties, and results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Internal armed 
conflicts are the ones that occur between the government of a state and one or more 
organized armed groups (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2014). 
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variables and control variables, such as local capacity, vary from year to year, and thus, the 
model suggested by Beck et al. (1998) is more appropriate.  
  The model is run with robust standard errors clustered on conflict/host country. These 
robust standard errors are calculated conceding that observations between host countries 
are independent, yet observations within the host country (such as within the Democratic 
Republic of Congo) are not necessarily independent of each other (Fortna 2004b).  
Dependent Variables 
  Peace operations have undergone various changes, and undertaken multiple tasks, 
ranging from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, with the proliferation of intra-state armed 
conflicts after the Cold War (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Thus it would be incorrect, as Diehl 
and Druckman (2010) note, to treat all the operations the same by measuring their success 
using the same criteria. As Whalan (2013) notes, the aggregate evaluation of peace 
operation performance has little value. Though each peace mission is mandated with 
different tasks, there are “certain general functions common to all operations, and, therefore, 
one can construct some standards for success that cut across all operations” (Diehl and 
Druckman 2010, 29).  
  Most notably, peace operations are assigned common core goals that are shared by 
all stakeholders. Even though these goals are “associated most often with traditional 
peacekeeping operations, virtually all peace operations seek to achieve violence abatement, 
conflict containment and conflict settlement” (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 29). Employing the 
Diehl and Druckman Evaluation Criteria, I assess the effectiveness and success of peace 
operations in implementing their core goals.21 
Violence Abatement  
                                                
21 IGO networks may take more than one year for success, and I am able to account for that 
through repeated year observations.    
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  Peacekeepers are often charged with abating violence in the countries in which they 
are deployed. Since peace operations are almost always deployed in countries ravaged by 
violence, the most fundamental goal of these operations becomes the elimination or 
reduction of violence (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Based on this criterion proposed by Diehl 
and Druckman, should peacekeepers reduce or eliminate violence in the host country after 
their deployment, the mission would qualify as a success. Thus, the first question that should 
be addressed in coding violence abatement success is whether violence levels decreased 
since deployment of peacekeepers (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Clear indicators of violence 
abatement are shooting incidents and dispute-related civilian casualties, as suggested by 
Diehl and Druckman (2013). I surveyed news reports, IGO reports and briefings, and 
UCDP/PRIO One-Sided Violence Dataset v 1.4-2014, 1989-2013, to code the violent 
abatement variable. It is coded “1” if the peace operations deployed were able to collectively 
reduce the violence22 in a year after they were deployed, as was the case in Bosnia after 
1996, and “0” otherwise.23 
Conflict Containment  
  Proliferation of internal armed conflicts following the end of Cold War constituted the 
greatest challenge for the international community as well as IGOs. These wars, apart from 
causing humanitarian tragedies, have constantly threatened to escalate beyond their point of 
origin to additional areas within countries’ borders and to neighboring states, and to 
destabilize entire regions (Solana 1999). Therefore, reducing the number of belligerents and 
eliminating the diffusion of the conflict become among the core tasks shared by most peace 
                                                
22 The violence level before the deployment of peacekeepers is accepted as the baseline. In 
that sense, if peacekeeping IGOs reduce the violence after their deployment (not necessarily 
to zero), it is considered as a success.  
23 The variable only focuses on the violence levels in the host country, not in neighboring 
states.  
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operations (Diehl and Druckman 2013). Containing conflict helps to reduce its intensity and 
hence contributes to its abatement.  
  I judge the success of conflict containment by studying actor-based and geographic 
containment. First, I assess conflict containment performance by examining the geographic 
scope: that is, whether the conflict or violence has spread to new areas during the year in 
question. As suggested by Diehl and Druckman (2010), I start with the original deployment 
as a baseline. Though no peace operation would be able to cover an entire country, 
particularly if deployed in countries with huge land mass such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, peacekeepers may be able to stop arms transfer or troop movement “that enhances 
the opportunity for violence across the country” (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 37). Second, I 
measure the success of conflict along the actor dimension. Although it may be problematic to 
assign the acts of violence or conflict to certain actors, as Diehl and Druckman (2010) note, 
a simple count of parties to the conflict, and interveners, may be used to assess the success 
of conflict containment with regard to its actor dimension. Specifically, reduction in the 
number of actors or preventing new actors from entering into the conflict may be viewed as 
an indicator of success in containing conflict (Diehl and Druckman 2013).   
  Provided that conflict did not spread to new areas or that the involvement of new 
actors was prevented, it is coded “1”, denoting success in containing conflict. It is coded “0” if 
peace operations did not accomplish any of the tasks listed above. IGO reports, briefings, 
and the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013) are 
utilized to code the conflict containment success variable. 
Conflict Settlement  
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  Conflict settlement refers to the resolution of disputes between belligerents. For Diehl 
and Druckman, “settling the conflict such that the probability of future violence is low might 
perhaps be the greatest achievement for a peace operation” (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 42).  
  The key question for evaluating conflict settlement success is whether the parties to 
the conflict have resolved their major disagreements after the deployment of peacekeepers 
(Diehl and Druckman 2013). Peacekeepers may or may not undertake tasks such as 
negotiating with parties to the conflict or resolving contentious issues between belligerents. 
In any case peace operations are expected to create the environment that would facilitate 
peace negotiations and thereby the settlement of the conflict (Diehl and Druckman 2010). 
  Thus, the commencement of negotiations or mediation between the conflict parties, 
or the signing of peace agreements among disputants, can be viewed as indicators of 
success in conflict settlement. The coding decision for this variable is based on progress 
reports and press briefings by IGOs as suggested by Diehl and Druckman (2010). 
Embracing a more minimalist approach than pursued by Diehl and Druckman (2010), I code 
peace operations as a success, “1,” the peace agreement is signed, or negotiations are 
started after the deployment of peacekeepers, as was the case in Côte d’Ivoire, and “0” 
otherwise.24  
Independent Variables  
Inter-Organizational Network Structure 
  This dissertation studies collaborative relations among IGOs in peace operations from 
a social network perspective. Specifically, I examine whether the structural properties of IGO 
networks, particularly network centralization and density 25 , might be linked to the 
                                                
24 In a sense I am incorporating partial success with success.  
25 I examine the whole network, rather than the relations between IGO dyads. 
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performance of peace operations in violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict 
settlement. 
  In network parlance, centralization refers to the “particular properties of graph 
structure as a whole” (Scott 2000, 85) and the overall integration of a network. 
Centralization, therefore, describes the extent to which network cohesion is organized 
around particular focal points, i.e. central organizations (Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 
1995). The centralization measure is calculated as the “ratio of the actual sum of differences 
to the maximum possible sum of differences” (Scott 2000, 93) and varies between “0” and 1, 
where “0” denotes an extremely decentralized network, and “1” denotes an extremely 
centralized network. 
  The density of a network, on the other hand, represents the extensiveness of ties 
between network actors or nodes. More specifically, density denotes the extent to which ties 
are redundant within a network, suggesting that members are connected both directly and 
indirectly through other members (Scott 2000). Density measures range between “0” and “1”, 
which indicate loosely and richly joined networks, respectively (Aldrich and Whetten 1981). 
The concept of loosely joined network, Aldrich and Whetten (1981) note, can be understood 
by considering the number of missing links, i.e. non-collaborative IGOs, or the number of 
holes. To illustrate, if out of a potential 90 links between 18 organizations, only 23 are 
present, a density score of 0.26 results.  
  I calculated yearly network-level centralization and density measures for each IGO 
network deployed in an internal armed conflict using the sna package in R.                               
Organizational Resource Capacity Homophily 
  For organizational capacity coding, I rely on Pearson et al.’s (2013) operationalization 
of IGOs, with some modifications, as organizations with large capacity (n=3), such as NATO; 
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mid-level capacity (n=6), such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and limited 
capacity (n=11), such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The 
capacity is determined by human and financial resources at the organization’s disposal. The 
data is derived from websites and reports of IGOs.  
  The variable is calculated as the proportion of the links between IGOs with equal 
organizational resource capacities to the sum of all IGO collaborative links in each IGO 
network in each year. In that sense, this variable is applicable to an IGO network.  
Organizational Function Homophily 
Based on the activities they undertake during peace operations, IGOs are coded as civilian 
(n=13), such as the EU; military (n=2), such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO); and mixed (n=5), such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
  The variable is calculated as the proportion of the links between IGO dyads with the 
same organizational function to the sum of IGO collaborative links in each IGO network. The 
variable captures the match of organizational security culture in regard to the whole IGO 
networks, rather than IGO dyads.  
Control Variables  
Conflict Intensity  
  It is a binary variable that takes into account the violence level of the conflict, i.e., 
whether it has exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths since the onset of the conflict, and “0” 
otherwise. The data source is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 
(Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015). 
Conflict Issue  
  A dichotomous measure of conflict issue is utilized denoting “1” if the conflict is waged 
due to disagreements over territorial issues, and “0” if it is related to ideological disagreements, 
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such as regime type. It comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which codes 
conflict issues in terms of incompatibility concerning territory and incompatibility concerning 
government, e.g., type of political system.  
Size  
  The country size (in square miles) denotes the sum of all land and water areas of the 
conflict country delimited by international coastlines and/or boundaries. The variable is logged, 
and drawn from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).  
Ethnic Fractionalization (Polarization) 
  For the ethnic fractionalization variable, I relied on Fearon’s (2003) ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization index (ELF). The index measures the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from the population would belong to two different ethnic groups. I constructed a 
dummy variable that is “1” if fractionalization score is between one standard deviation above 
and below the mean, and 0 otherwise. 
Local Capacity  
  To capture the conflict country’s local capacity, I use logged GDP per capita (in USD) 
as a proxy for host country’s capacity. The data source is the World Bank. 
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Violence Abatement 
 
Conflict Containment 
0.534 
 
0.374 
0.500 
 
0.485 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
1 
174 
 
174 
 
Conflict Settlement 
 
0.471 
 
0.500 
 
0 
 
1 
 
174 
Centralization 0.310 0.380 0 1 174 
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Density 0.822 0.217 0.33 1 174 
Function 0.353 0.368 0 1 174 
Resource Capacity 0.416 0.354 0 1 174 
Conflict Intensity 0.586 0.494 0 1 174 
Conflict Issue 0.445 0.499 0 1 174 
Country Size (Log) 20.421 2.185 13.808 22.926 174 
Ethnic Polarization 0.534 0.256 0.095 0.933 174 
GDP per capita (Log) 6.715 1.163 4.171 9.390 167 
Results  
  Table 5.2 presents the estimates of my models. My models seem to indicate that the 
effect of IGO networks’ centralization on peace operation performance is indistinguishable 
from zero. While the estimated coefficients for the network centralization variable remain 
positive, as I hypothesized, I cannot claim that centralization has an effect in accounting for a 
peace operation’s success. This result may imply that factors that are highly correlated to 
peace operation performance are conditioning the success or failure of peace missions.  
  While I find consistent evidence that the density of networks increases the likelihood 
of peace operation success in the areas of violence abatement and conflict settlement, it fails 
to reach statistical significance in the conflict containment model [see Table 5.2]. As I 
expected, the density of IGO networks is positively related to conflict settlement and the 
coefficient is statistically significant. This finding underlines that, although integrating different 
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IGO forces into a cohesive inter-organizational force poses a challenge in terms of the 
interoperability of the mission at the operational level, the involvement of all viable actors, 
such as regional and sub-regional organizations, in peace processes helps to settle conflicts, 
presumably because it legitimates the peace settlement and its terms; the involvement of 
local actors may also may enhance the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of the local 
populations, which is often cited as a key factor in operation success. Legitimacy is critical 
for peace operations success as “it can increase buy-in and effectiveness; the objectives of 
the mission are endorsed and more states want to contribute financially and militarily” (Gelot 
2012, 10). 
Table 5.2. Logistic Regression Analyses of the Effect of Inter-Organizational 
Networking on Peace Operations’ Core Goals, 1990-2013. 
 Violence Abatement Conflict Containment Conflict Settlement 
IGO Network 
Characteristics 
   
Centralization 0.666(1.470) 1.585(2.364) 1.563(1.181) 
Density 6.790(3.597)* 2.764(3.456) 3.474(2.083)* 
Resource 
Capacity 
-2.768(1.510)* -5.998(2.037)** -1.279(1.063) 
Organizational 
Function 
5.756(2.321)** -2.295(1.519) .165(1.325) 
Conflict 
Characteristics 
   
Conflict Intensity 4.324(2.090)** 0.026(1.215) -0.401(1.261) 
Conflict Issue 1.974(1.023)* -0.341(0.954) -2.352(0.897)** 
Host Country 
Characteristics 
   
Country Size 
(log) 
-0.874(0.408)** -0.424(0.253)* -0.113(0.224) 
Ethnic 
Polarization 
-3.330(1.827)* 0.832(0.939) 2.125(0.762)** 
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GDP per capita 
(log)(t-1) 
0.927(0.484)* 0.613(0.434) 0.217(0.445) 
Constant -1070.346(562.135)* -352.539(703.892) -473.865(773.155) 
Pseudo-R2 0.532 0.440 0.305 
N 144 144 144 
 
(Notes. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses clustered by conflict country. 
Dependent variables are violence abatement success, conflict containment success, and 
conflict settlement success. Cubic splines are not shown. Statistical significance:   ***p < 
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.. N=14426). 
 
  Contrary to my expectations, the resource capacity measure is negative and 
statistically significant in violence abatement and conflict containment models. Two 
candidate explanations for this negative relationship might be resource dependency and 
resource scarcity. Many regional formations, particularly those in Africa, are still embryonic 
and need support from global arrangements if they are to implement the goals of peace 
missions. Thus these IGO networks, and consequently the missions they deploy, would be 
better off if IGOs with high or medium capacity were to match the needs of regional or sub-
regional organizations lacking these resources (limited capacity IGOs). 
  Again as hypothesized peace operations deployed by organizations sharing the same 
organizational function also appear quite likely to result in positive outcomes regarding 
violence abatement (though not necessarily in conflict settlement). As noted earlier, this 
finding may indicate that organizational function homophily facilitates the construction of 
trust, and thus translates into better coordination and cohesion among IGOs collaborating to 
abate violence. This positive relationship does not hold for the conflict containment model. 
                                                
26 Missing observations are an inherent problem in any time-series cross-section dataset and 
my study is not free of this issue. My local capacity variable, which is measured by GDP per 
capita, contains missing variables, which drives down the total number of observations. 
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Nor is the relationship between organizational function homophily and conflict settlement 
statistically significant. 
  The evidence is mixed on whether conflict and conflict country characteristics might 
affect the outcome of the core goals of peace operations. I find no evidence of a relationship 
between conflict intensity and performance in achieving conflict containment and settlement. 
Surprisingly, the conflict intensity coefficient is positive in affecting violence abatement 
success, suggesting that peace operations deployed in high-intensity conflicts will be more 
likely to be successful in abating conflict. In line with this finding, Sousa (2015) points out 
that military intervention, as a form of peace operation does not have an impact on the 
escalation or de-escalation of low-intensity conflicts. A reasonable explanation may be that 
high-intensity conflicts receive more resources and attention, presumably increasing the 
chance of peace operation success. Also, Luttwak (1999) notes that war and violence indeed 
bring peace after the culminating phase of violence has been passed. 
  Prior studies noted that peace operations deployed in conflicts over territory, as 
opposed to disagreements over regime type or governance, would be less likely to succeed 
in abating violence. Contrary to my expectation, the direction of the coefficient is positive, 
and statistically significant with a two-tailed p-value of 0.001, indicating that peace operations 
deployed in conflicts over tangible issues, e.g., disagreements over territorial issues, are 
more likely to be successful in reducing violence. 
  As expected, the coefficient for conflict issue has a negative sign in conflict 
containment and settlement models, though the relationship between territorial claims and 
conflict containment fails to achieve statistical significance. As can be seen from the negative 
coefficient (which is also significant), peace operations tend to have a difficult time settling 
conflicts over territorial disagreements. That is, the success of peace operations in conflict 
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settlement will decrease substantially should the conflict break out over territorial 
disagreements, which are often secessionist in nature. One candidate explanation is that 
parties to the conflict would be less likely to give concessions or give up their claims over a 
territory to which they may have an emotional attachment and with which they may identify, 
as was the case in the Yugoslav Wars. 
  The last set of variables examines or controls for the relationship between the 
success of peace operations in achieving their core goals and the host country 
characteristics. In line with previous research, across all specifications, the effect of host 
country size on peace operation success is negative, and statistically significant (with the 
exception of conflict settlement). This finding underlines the assertion that the size of the 
host country does matter for the success of peace operations, particularly with regard to 
violence abatement and conflict containment. As Diehl and Druckman noted, “even with an 
extremely large peace force, securing large areas may be impractical” (Diehl and Druckman 
2009, 17). For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo is 875525 square miles and 
shares a border with nine other states in addition to the ocean (Diehl and Druckman 2009), 
which makes containing conflict (geographically) extremely difficult.  
  I posit that peace operations would tend to have less success achieving their core 
goals in ethnically polarized countries. Similar to extant research that establishes a strong 
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and conflict onset, my findings suggest that 
once violence breaks out, it may be more likely to spiral out of control in countries polarized 
along ethnic lines, as it is likely to incite further fractionalization, whether ideological, 
religious, or sectarian. Violence will harden the feeling of enmity and hostility among conflict 
parties, even leading to retaliatory attacks. Contrary to previous studies on the subject, 
however, I found a positive (and significant) relationship between ethnic fractionalization 
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(polarization) and conflict settlement, suggesting that peace missions would be more likely to 
settle conflicts in ethnically polarized countries. This finding corroborates Heldt (2001), who 
found a positive and statistically significant relationship between ethnic polarization and 
peace operation success. This result demonstrates that ethnic fractionalization is a 
significant factor in the reasons that peace operations are successful in conflict settlement in 
some countries but not in others.  
  For Heldt (2001), ethnic fractionalization (polarization) implies that there are fewer 
groups in the host country that peacekeepers have to negotiate between, which facilitates 
settlements. These findings should be treated with caution, though, as a different 
operationalization of the ethnic polarization variable (along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines) 
may yield different results.  
  Lastly, the relationship between GDP per capita, as a proxy for local capacity in the 
host country, and the performance of peace operations’ core goals is positive. However, it 
only reaches statistical significance in the violence abatement model. This result may be 
explained by two factors. First, once violence breaks out in a country with local capacities—
high GDP per capita—the population will be more willing to break the cycle of violence (as 
they have a lot to lose). Second, along with peacekeepers’ help, the country may be able to 
direct its resources to reverse the violent trend.  
Illustrative Cases  
  This part of the chapter focuses on inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs 
engaged in peace missions in three internal armed conflicts: Côte d’Ivoire, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Sudan:Darfur,27 to illustrate the relationship between the 
                                                
27 Given the fact that the majority of peace missions (approximately 70%, 
[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/]) are deployed and operate in Africa, two of 
three illustrative cases this study analyzes are African peace operations. Additionally, African 
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structural properties and composition of IGO networks and peace operations’ effectiveness 
in executing their core goals. These three cases were selected because they illustrate varied 
levels operational success in implementing core goals of missions, i.e., conflict abatement, 
conflict containment and conflict settlement, as well as varied levels of network density28 and 
composition: Côte d’Ivoire intervention being a quite dense network29, IGO networks in 
Bosnia30 being a relatively sparse network compared to networks in Côte d’Ivoire, and finally 
Sudan:Darfur31 intervention being the most sparse network among other IGO networks 
focused as cases. 
  These cases provide a general overview of the events leading up the deployment of 
peace operations in the conflicts under study. It should be noted that, even if significant, 
cases would not focus on the background of the conflict (though it is touched upon). The 
main goal here is to discuss and illustrate the interaction between the characteristics of IGO 
networks, i.e., their structure and composition, and the performance of peace missions 
operating in Côte d’Ivoire, BiH and Sudan:Darfur, by applying the Diehl-Druckman 
Evaluation Criteria.   
  Though peacekeeping comes with many different missions and tasks, there are 
common goals each operation strives to implement” (Diehl and Druckman 2015). According 
to Diehl and Druckman (2010; 2013; 2015), peacekeeping IGOs aim to achieve three core 
goals. One core goal of peace operations is violence abatement that is the reduction or 
elimination of violence in the host country. Another core goal, conflict containment, refers to 
                                                                                                                                                         
regional and sub-regional organizations are more proactive in addressing the conflicts in 
their region and likely to collaborate with other IGOs.   
28 Network density scores range between 0 and 1.  
29 IGO network density in Côte d’Ivoire varies between 0.833 and 1 for the years under study 
(2002-2013). 
30 IGO network density in Bosnia ranges between 0.666 and 1 (1992-2009). 
31 IGO network density in Sudan:Darfur remains 0.666 for all years under study (2004-2013).  
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“preventing conflict from spreading geographically, including across national borders, as well 
as keeping the conflict encompassing new actors, both state and sub-national” (Diehl and 
Druckman 2015, 103). The last core goal that peace operations strive to achieve, for Diehl 
and Druckman (2010), is conflict settlement. The presence of formal agreements after the 
deployment of peacekeepers could be judged as a conflict settlement success.  
Violence Abatement Success in Côte d’Ivoire 
  The elimination or reduction of violence is one of the core goals of peace missions, 
Diehl and Druckman (2010) note. Relying on the UCDP’s One-Sided Violence Dataset 
(version v1.4-2014), the decrease in number of casualties and absence of violence in the 
host country after the deployment of peacekeepers is used as the indicator to signify 
success.  
  A failed coup to topple the President Laurent Gbagbo in September 2002 unraveled 
the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. The armed insurgency launched by the Patriotic Movement of 
Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) led by disgruntled army officers from marginalized groups in the 
northern part of the country was joined by two other armed groups, the Mouvement 
Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Paix et la Justice 
(MP) and united under the Forces Nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro (Bellamy and Williams 
2013). Taking control of the country’s mainly Muslim North, Muslim rebels demanded the 
resignation of the head of the state, an inclusive election, and reconsideration of issues of 
nationality and citizenship (Novosseloff 2015). 
  Though the failed coup escalated the tensions in the country, the conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire must be examined within a larger context influenced by three major dimensions 
(Novosseloff 2015). The first dimension was the power struggle and social and political 
disorder following the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. The debate over 
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national identity, Ivoirité, in relation to eligibility to run for presidency, was the second 
dimension that accounted for the conflict in the country (Akindès 2004). Lastly, the third 
dimension was the burgeoning economic crisis as a result of historical migratory movements 
along with immigration waves from neighboring countries (Novosseloff 2015). While the 
liberal immigration and investment policies of the founding father of the country, Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, attracted an influx of foreign investors and laborers, and contributed to 
economic growth, the fall of coffee and cocoa32 prices led the economic foundations of the 
system to falter (The World Bank Report 2008).   
  Not only were the questions of Ivoirité and immigration crises among the factors that 
contributed to the discontent in the country but they also constituted the reasons behind the 
neighboring countries’ strong interest in internal affairs of Côte d’Ivoire as well as the 
ECOWAS decision to intervene (Schori 2015). Specifically, the presence of millions of 
immigrants from neighboring countries, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, in Côte 
d’Ivoire, and the country’s porous borders meant that the security of the country was a great 
concern for regional stability (Hara and Yabi 2013).   
  The unilateral French deployment, Opération Licorne, deployed in 2002, was followed 
by an ECOWAS peacekeeping force (included around 1500 or so troops formed by West 
African states [Dwan and Wiharta 2005]), the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), 
and a small United Nations political mission, United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(MINUCI). Working in collaboration with the ECOMICI and MINUCI, France brokered the 
ceasefire and initiated the negotiations between the government and rebel forces that 
eventually led to an officially-proclaimed Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The agreement laid 
out a plan for the formation of an interim Government of National Reconciliation (Holt et al. 
                                                
32 Côte d’Ivoire is the top exporter of cocoa in the world (The World Bank Report 2009).  
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2009), and ECOMICI was mandated to monitor the Ivorian government’s and rebel forces’ 
compliance with the peace agreement (Nowrojee 2004).  
  Even though the proximity of ECOWAS to the conflict country helped the organization 
to retain its consistent position on the leadership (Yabi 2012), the limitation of ECOWAS 
resources and capabilities resulted in the organization’s extreme dependency on Western 
donors and extra-regional organizations, consequently its call for a robust UN and AU 
involvement (Hara and Yabi 2013).  
  Acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was established in 2004 by the Security Council Resolution 1528. The 
operation had strength of 6, 910 total uniformed personnel, including troops, military 
observers, staff and police officers (UNOCI, un.org). While it was initially mandated to 
support the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the protection of civilians 
and violence abatement gained a higher priority over the course of the operation (Holt et al. 
2009). Having suffered from financial and logistical constraints, ECOMICI was eventually 
taken up by the UN and became the first blue helmets of UNOCI (De Wet 2014). Despite the 
lack of required assets, ECOWAS’s quick deployment filled in the UN’s capability gap in 
terms of rapid response and prepared the ground for a robust UN mission (Brosig 2015).  
  ECOWAS acted independently in interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone thanks to 
Nigeria’s military and logistical support, yet it was heavily dependent on the UN’s support in 
Cote d’Ivoire. Indeed, given the financial obstacles associated with maintaining a fully 
autonomous peacekeeping operation, working in tandem with the UN was attractive for 
ECOWAS. Operating under the auspices of the UN, ECOWAS was the source of UNOCI’s 
military strength and the most central actor of the peace process (De Wet 2014).  
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  In addition to resource complementarity and dependence, the question of partiality 
accounted for the ECOWAS-UN collaboration in Côte d’Ivoire and its performance. Some of 
ECOWAS member states, such as Liberia and Burkina Faso, were sympathetic to the 
Ivorian protagonists, and were criticized for their support of the rebels. For instance, in 2005, 
Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo refused to attend ECOWAS-led peace talks in the 
Nigerian capital, Abuja. He claimed that ECOWAS members supported rebels, who seized 
the control of northern part of the country, and thus, the organization lost its impartiality. He 
demanded the withdrawal of ECOWAS forces from Côte d’Ivoire and called for UN and AU 
led negotiations (IRIN News 2005). 
  As Schori (2015) argues, on the one hand having various organizations deployed in 
the same conflict may be problematic since it generates the problem of having too many 
views and perspectives to harmonize, and adds tasks, such as extra meetings. On the other 
hand, IGOs, and particularly the UN, obtain invaluable help by being able to count on other 
organizations. ECOWAS’s in-depth knowledge of Côte d’Ivoire, and its hands-on secretariat 
in Abuja, for instance, provided sustained interest and commitment to the resolution of the 
conflict.      
  Furthermore, the lack of communication with host populations is often regarded as 
the main cause of missed “warning signs of impending violence” (Holt et al. 2009, 304). 
Presence of a sub-regional organization, i.e., ECOWAS, with the knowledge of culture and 
language of the country was extremely effective in being able to undertake preventive 
measures and, thus, dampening violence that is a clear indicator of mission success, for 
Diehl and Druckman Evaluation Criteria.  
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  Even though periodic low-level violence continued in Côte d’Ivoire, interventions by 
the UN and ECOWAS along with the AU and France, as the former colonial power33, 
prevented the escalation of conflict following the contested elections held in 2003-2004 and 
2010-2011 from evolving into a full-scale civil war (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 70). The 
cycle of violence, which erupted in 2003 and 2010, as is shown in Figure 5.1, was halted by 
robust and continued joint patrolling particularly by ECOWAS and UN (Holt et al. 2009).  
  Similarly, despite reoccurrence of violence following the elections, the dense network 
formed by collaborations among AU, ECOWAS and the UN, and coordination and cohesion 
facilitated by organizational function homophily34 helped the organizations to respond quickly 
to post-electoral breakdown and pool required resources and military strength against 
spoilers, and thus, to be able to enforce robust measures to decrease violence.  
Figure 5.1: Violence in Côte d’Ivoire, 2002-2013 
 
                                                
33 Even though the presence of French forces along with the UN, AU and ECOWAS played a 
crucial role in abating violence in Côte d’Ivoire, French intervention is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
34 Organizational function homophily represents the homophily in the IGO network. This 
variable is calculated as the proportion of the links between participating IGOs with the same 
organizational function, i.e., military, civilian, and mixed, to the total IGO collaborative links in 
the given network. AU, ECOWAS and UN are coded as mixed organizations resulting in a 
homophilous network.  
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Note: The data source is the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v1.4, 2014. The dataset 
reports no fatalities for years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013. 
     The disputed presidential runoff election between former president Gbagbo, and former 
prime minister Quattara escalated the tensions in Côte d’Ivoire. The election “was designed 
to cap an often forestalled peace process defines by the 2007 Ouagadougou Political 
Agreement” (Cook 2011, 1). After Quattara claimed electoral victory based on the UN 
certified election results announced by the Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 
international community recognized and supported the IEC announced results as legitimate, 
and demanded Gbagbo to hand power over to Quattara. Yet, Gbagbo rejected IEC’s 
decision, and appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council (ICC). The ICC annulled the 
IEC’s decision and declared Gbagbo as the president. Thus, based on the ICC’s decision, 
Gbagbo refused to step down. The electoral standoff in turn led to the rise of violence and 
attacks against peacekeepers (Cook 2011).  
  After months of clashes following the elections in November 2010, the military 
offensive by forces loyal to the president-elect Alassane Ouattara with ECOWAS and UN’s 
military support defeated the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo (Annual Review of 
Global Peace Operations 2012). While the UNOCI enforced its military strength against the 
Gbagbo forces and adopted sanctions against his administration in collaboration with the 
EU35, ECOWAS and the AU exerted pressure on Mr. Gbagbo to step down and suspended 
Côte d’Ivoire from their organizations until Quattara would assume power (Annual Review of 
Global Peace Operations 2012). The punitive military measures coupled with regional 
                                                
35 On March 30, 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter imposing sanctions against former President Laurent Gbagbo 
and his close associates to end the surge of violence in the country and protect civilians, 
including the use heavy weaponry against them 
(http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10215.doc.htm). 
  
 
   
111 
political efforts played a decisive role in stopping the campaign of violence and prompting the 
Gbagbo forces to stop fighting.  
  In conclusion, notwithstanding the rise of violence for a short period of time following 
the elections, the dense network formed by the AU-UN and ECOWAS collaboration was able 
to bring a halt to violence in Côte d’Ivoire; thus their collaborative efforts should be judged as 
a success based on the Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria. This dense network (ranges 
between 0.833 and 1 for the years under study) presumably was instrumental in enhancing 
the legitimacy of the operations in the eyes of local population and pooling military and 
financial capabilities to undertake robust measures.  
Conflict Containment Success in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) 
  The second core goal of peace operations is the containment of conflict in the host 
country. According to Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria, conflict containment refers to 
preventing the conflict from spreading new areas, and keeping the conflict from including 
new actors, e.g., neighboring countries (Diehl and Druckman 2010). The most obvious 
indicators of conflict containment are “those based on the number of actors and location of 
violent incidents” (Diehl and Druckman 2015, 2013). To explain the role of inter-
organizational networks in accounting for the performance of peace operations in containing 
conflict, I have chosen to consider the case of Bosnia. 
  The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the declarations of 
independence by the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 marks the start of the 
conflict in Bosnia in 1991. Bosnia was the most multi-ethnic republic among the Yugoslav 
Republics. The country was composed of three main ethnic groups: the Croats (17 percent 
based on the 1991 census), the Serbs (31 percent) and the Muslims (41 percent) (Tardy 
2015).  
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  Following the independence and secession of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia held a 
referendum on self-determination on February 29, 1992. And on March 1, 1992, the country 
declared its independence from Yugoslavia (Tardy 2015). Yet, the proclamation of 
independence of Bosnia propagated attacks by Bosnian Serbs under the leadership of 
Radovan Karadzic. In a desire to create homogenous Serb areas within the territory of 
Bosnia and to unite with Serbia, the “Yugoslav People’s Army together with paramilitary 
forces from Serbia carried out the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia” (Bartulovic 2006, 52).  
  The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the first peace mission in Former 
Yugoslavia, was established in 1992 in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create an 
environment conducive to a peace settlement in former Yugoslavia. In response to continued 
Serb "aggression," [Serbs saw it as rightful opposition to dismemberment of the state with 
outside interference and premature recognition of new states] and growing humanitarian 
crisis UNPROFOR’s mandate was extent to Bosnia in 1992 (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005).  
  UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia was mandated by the Security Council to monitor 
cease-fire arrangements between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government forces that 
entered into force on January 1, 1995. UNPROFOR was composed of 39,406 personnel, 
including military personnel and civilian police, local and international staff.36 
  Fighting in Bosnia came to an end on October 11, 1995. On December 14, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Agreement, that signified the formal end to the civil 
war, and thus, facilitated the deployment of additional peace missions over the next decade 
(Diehl and Druckman 2010). Even though a key role for major powers may not be necessary 
for the success of peace missions, they may empower IGO peacekeeping to some extent. 
                                                
36 UNPROFOR, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm 
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While the United States (US) played a limited role in the early stages of the conflict, the US 
role became more critical as the crises continued (Burg and Shoup 1999). Indeed, similar to 
French efforts in Côte d’Ivoire, the US mediation efforts in cooperation with participating 
IGOs, i.e., UN, NATO, and the EU, were instrumental in the negotiation and signing of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.  
  On December 20, 1995, the NATO-led Multinational Implementation Force, known as 
IFOR, took over from UNPROFOR, and assumed the primary peacekeeping role in Bosnia. 
IFOR’s size was around 60,000 troops drawn from Allied and partner countries. The mission 
operated under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter and derived its mandate from the UN 
Security Council. In 1996, IFOR was succeeded by the NATO-led Stabilization Force, known 
as SFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR operated under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and was 
composed of 32,000 troops from Allied countries (nato.int). 
  The European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea operation that was authorized by the 
European Council in 2004, and confirmed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1575 as a 
Chapter VII operation, succeeded SFOR in 2004. When it was deployed, EUFOR Althea had 
the force level of between 6,500 and 7,000 (Knauer 2011). As a continuation of the NATO 
operation, EUFOR Althea had a Chapter VII mandate and maintained a ‘deterrent’ force 
(Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006). 
  The Security Council established the United Nations International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office that were brought together as the United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 
took over from UNMIBH on January 10, 2003 (UNMIBH). In addition to these operations, 
OSCE mission (a civilian mission) maintains field offices across Bosnia (Annual Review of 
Global Peace Operations 2006).  
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  As listed above, Bosnia hosted a complex peacekeeping architecture that “evolved 
out of the 1995 Dayton Accords, originally intended to act as the basis for a relatively short-
lived international presence” (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, 100). In the 
late 1990s and in the 2000s, the country witnessed cooperation among various 
organizations, such as NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN’s International Police 
Task Force (IPTF), the OSCE, and the EU forming a dense network of collaborative 
relations.  
  Despite dense networking conflict containment in Bosnia has a mixed record. It was 
regarded as a devastating failure before the Dayton Agreement (Diehl and Druckman 2010), 
conflict containment in Bosnia following the Dayton Agreement has been considered as a 
success by scholars, such as Diehl and Druckman (2010).  
  While the former Yugoslavian state, Serbia, continued to play a critical role in 
escalating conflict in Bosnia by providing arms, material and logistical support to Bosnian 
Serbs, and Croatia sporadically engaged in fighting (Diehl and Druckman 2010), collective 
peace efforts by IGOs still cannot be judged as a failure, as conflict containment success 
does not only focus on reducing the number of conflict parties or belligerents.  
  Conflict containment also constitutes preventing the conflict from spreading new 
areas and neighboring countries. In Bosnia, peace operations were largely effective in 
preventing the spread of the conflict to neighboring countries, such as Macedonia and 
Albania. The fighting was limited to Bosnian territory, “except for some expansion 
periodically into Croatia” (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 178). But, all in all, peacekeepers were 
able to confine the area of conflict.  
  Particularly, by employing robust enforcement and conflict management techniques 
that Dayton Agreement required (Tardy 2015), operations under the auspices of NATO and 
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the UN have proved to be effective in preventing the proliferation of spoilers and belligerents 
and containing the conflict from spreading to neighboring countries. For instance, The 
Secretary General of the UN reported that the threat of a NATO air intervention, and in fact, 
the actual attack, made it possible to negotiate an agreement on the withdrawal of heavy 
weapons from Sarajevo. The implementation of the agreement was possible because of “the 
added notion of enforcement by a credible third party” (S/1994/555, para. 8). Similarly, in 
collaboration with the UN, the rapid reaction force and heavy weapons in the possession of 
NATO were decisive in compelling Bosnian Serbs to comply with the provisions of the peace 
agreement, and pressuring Belgrade to cut off support to Bosnian Serb forces.  
  The degree to which the international community speaks with one voice to the major 
political actors and spoilers is critical in conflict containment as well since spoilers strive to 
play one international organization off another (Cockell 2002). In that sense, the dense 
network through collaborations among UN, NATO, OSCE and EU provided the channels for 
information exchange, facilitated coordination between organizations and ensured that they 
would take up a united stance against warring factions.  
  In line with the findings of my statistical analyses, incongruence of organizational 
function 37  between IGOs deployed in Bosnia was effective in accounting for conflict 
containment success. More specifically, collaborations among organizations with different 
organizational functions were effective in addressing different dimensions of the operations. 
While military organizations, such as NATO, were effective in containing the conflict by using 
military muscles and coercion, civilian organizations, such as OSCE and EU, proved to be 
successful in the negotiation phase. For instance, Serbia has shown commitment, albeit 
                                                
37 The organizational function homophily in Bosnian IGO networks range between 0.25 and 
0.33, representing heterophilous IGO networks.  
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somewhat limited, to cooperate with the international community regarding Bosnian war 
crimes as a stipulation for the country’s accession to the EU. 
  In conclusion, even though maintaining the coherence and coordination among 
organizations may become problematic over the course of the deployments, cases such as 
Bosnia illustrate that dense networks formed through collaborations among IGOs help peace 
operations to pool more resources and put more pressure on spoilers to contain the conflict.  
Conflict Settlement Success in Sudan:Darfur  
  Another core goal of peace operations concentrates on the settlement of the conflict 
in the host country. In this study, I employ a minimalistic approach to judge the success of 
conflict settlement. As slight modification of Diehl and Druckman Evaluation Criteria, which 
suggests that one of the key indicators of the peace operations’ success is the end of 
disagreements among belligerents, this study judged the mere presence of a peace 
agreement and the start of negotiations as a success in conflict settlement.  
  Peace agreements are not self-implementing, they require constant political attention, 
intensive regional and international engagement as well as will of key stakeholders (Hansen 
2015). Collective efforts by the AU, UN, IGAD, and to some extent the Arab League in 
Sudan, were effective in enhancing the legitimacy of the peace process, as well as regional 
and local buy-in, and eventually the progress of the peace process in Darfur. This case study 
describes how IGOs operating in the field approached the peace process in Darfur, and how 
their collective efforts affected the progress in conflict settlement.  
  Darfur, governed by a handful of British colonial administrators until 1956, “remained 
at the margin of the Sudanese state after independence” (Lanz 2015, 776). The conflict in 
Darfur is generally attributed to three factors: “competition between nomads and farmers for 
increasingly scarce resources, intensified by accelerating desertification; the political 
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manipulation of identities by various Sudanese and regional actors; and a pattern of political 
and economic marginalization stretching back to the colonial era” (Holt et al. 2009, 337).  
  The most recent episode of conflict in Darfur started in early 2003 when the long-term 
and systematic marginalization of Darfurians by the Government in Sudan led to a rebellion 
(Brosig 2010) by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The rebels accused the Arab-dominated Sudanese government 
in Khartoum of neglecting the Darfur region and arming the Janjaweed, militiamen formed by 
nomadic Muslim tribes, to target Darfur’s sedentary farming tribes categorized as ‘African’ 
(Barnett and Weiss 2011). The government responded to several attacks by rebel forces 
with a massive crackdown in which around 300,000 people were killed and two million 
Darfurians were displaced (Brosing 2010).  
  In the early stages of the conflict, the reaction to the crisis by international community 
was mixed. To illustrate, some members of the African Union, i.e., Nigeria, Chad, Libya, and 
Egypt, criticized the UN’s idea of imposing sanction to the Sudanese government arguing 
that the crisis should be addressed by African states and powers (Reagan and Aydin 2006). 
African nations’ hostility toward an international intervention contributed to the decision of 
international community to delegate the responsibility to normalize the situation in Darfur to 
the African Union (Luqman and Omede 2012).  
  In 2004, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)—a small observer force—was established 
bringing a total of 3,320 personnel, including military, civilian personnel as well as civilian 
police. The mission was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N’Djamena in 2004 as well as to contribute to 
a secure environment for the return of refugees and delivery of humanitarian assistance 
(UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan). When it was deployed, the AMIS had 
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neither the institutional mechanisms nor sufficient human and material resources to 
undertake the required peace and security roles (Gelot 2012, 49) though.  
  Also in places like Darfur where the parties show a greater readiness to settle their 
disputes with guns than around the negotiating table (Adada 2008), it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for missions such as AMIS, to get belligerents to agree on a peace agreement, 
or even a roadmap for an agreement. Operating in this environment, the AU had no choice 
but to call upon extra-regional organizations, such as the UN, to take part in the peace 
process. AMIS collaborated with and was supported by numerous IGOs throughout the 
process. For instance, while NATO airlifted the AU troops in and out of Darfur (Lanz 2015), 
the EU offered political, financial and technical support for the AU ceasefire-monitoring 
mission in Darfur and the subsequent peacekeeping missions (Barltrop 2011, 127). 
  UN operations are particularly difficult to authorize into states with a sitting regime 
(Badescu and Bergholm 2009). In this sense, when the AU agreed to deploy forces in 
Sudan, the UN members supported the AU’s decision as this would place the major burden 
of response (Williams 2013, 178) upon the AU and enhance the legitimacy of any possible 
UN deployment as the AU was the only IGO that had the Sudanese government’s consent 
(Badescu and Bergholm 2009).  
  When the drafters of the resolution added a clause “inviting” the Sudanese 
government’s consent to the deployment of a UN mission, the Sudanese Government seized 
this opportunity, and objected to the UN mission arguing that international forces has a 
hidden agenda (Barnett and Weiss 2011). President Omer Hassan al-Bashir and other 
Sudanese officials repeatedly rejected the notion of a transition from the AU mission to one 
involving non-African troops under a UN flag, which they portrayed as an “imperialistic” plan 
to “recolonize” Sudan (Harsch 2006). President Omar al-Bashir’s government dictated that 
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the AU would take the lead precisely ‘because it was the more benign option due to its 
operational and political constraints’ (Paddon 2011, 529).  
  In that environment, the hybrid African Union and United Nations Mission (UNAMID) 
was the solution proposed by then Secretary General Kofi Annan to address Khartoum’s 
resistance and reluctance regarding the questions of legitimacy (Lanz 2015). Established by 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1769 in July 2007, UNAMID was authorized to consist of 
up to 19,555 military personnel, including liaison officers and military observers, and civilian 
personnel. The mission was mandated to protect civilian populations under threat, prevent 
attacks against civilians, and assist the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement38 and 
any subsequent agreements (S/RES/1769[2007]). 
  Although UNAMID failed to get all viable actors to sign a sustainable peace 
agreement, it was relatively successful in promoting the peace process and leading the 
Darfur Dialogue of Consultation that brought sectors of society together to discuss the peace 
process (Lanz 2015). Additionally, the Doha Document for Peace brokered by the IGOs 
deployed in Darfur, though considered to be a failed attempt in producing a comprehensive 
peace agreement, brought about a useful conversation about Darfur’s future and the path to 
a comprehensive and inclusive solution to the conflict in the region. 
  In light of these developments, what could be argued regarding the role of dense IGO 
network formed by IGAD, AU, the Arab League and the UN in accounting for the success of 
the conflict settlement in Darfur? On the one hand, the presence of the AU, the Arab League 
and IGAD enabled the UN to avoid being viewed as an actor motivated by imperialist 
interests. Similarly, the presence of regional actors also helped IGOs that engaged in 
                                                
38 The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, also known as the Abuja Agreement, was signed 
between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A. The agreement was led by the AU, yet 
representatives from other IGOs, such as the Arab League, the UN, and the EU were 
present and worked in collaboration with the AU. 
  
 
   
120 
negotiations to garner and secure regional and local support for the peace process. On the 
other hand, African states sought the UN’s support and endorsement of the regional actions, 
particularly that of the AU, in Darfur, as they wanted the peace process to be viewed as 
furthering regional as well as international interests (Gelot 2012).  
  In Darfur, IGAD assumed a supporting role in peace process through its mediation 
efforts as well. The efforts within IGAD to improve security arrangements in the Horn of 
Africa took place in the context of a broad international consensus that regional 
organizations should contribute to the management of conflict and the maintenance of 
international order (Healy 2009, 1). For instance, regional actors and leaders praised IGAD’s 
engagement in African conflicts. Mr. Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda, with regard 
to IGAD’s role in Sudan, claimed that countries in IGAD region (the Horn of Africa) and Africa 
as a whole created a viable partnership “which reduces chances for outsiders to jump into 
solving regional conflicts yet they have very little knowledge of them” (Tavares 2010, 53).  
  In collaboration with the IGAD, UNAMID has played a leading role in coordination of 
international efforts. UNAMID also strived to localize peace process and empower Darfurians 
to limit the role of rebel groups (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012). 
  Even though negotiations in Darfur failed to reach a comprehensive, full-fledged 
peace agreement that would settle the conflict, the collaborative efforts between the IGOs 
can be viewed as a relative success, as they were able to get warring parties and the 
government to the negotiation table. Similar to peace operations deployed in Côte d’Ivoire, 
the presence of African peacekeepers proved essential for the legitimacy of the operation 
and generating a popular sentiment that the process was a homegrown initiative. While the 
presence of the UN provided the international legitimacy the peace process was in need of, 
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the presence of regional and/or sub-regional organizations, such as the AU, and IGAD, 
enhanced the local legitimacy (Gelot 2012).  
  However, different from peace operations in Bosnia and Côte d’Ivoire, the conflict in 
Darfur did not receive an intervention by a major power or a former colonial country, as was 
the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, and US negotiation efforts in Bosnia. Even though 
the absence of the intervention by a former colonial state may have helped to garner local 
and national support for the peace process and negotiations, peace missions were deprived 
of the material and intellectual impetus that these powers can provide  (Bellamy and Williams 
2005). Partnerships in peace operations do not mean that all parties agree on all aspects of 
the mission; yet it is still important to develop a shared framework to ensure “engagement 
through a feeling of mutual ownership” (Clement and Smith 2009, 10). In this sense, it can 
be argued that having similar organizational function would facilitate the process while 
sustaining links, and thus, generate a more positive environment for partnering 
organizations.  
  The findings of my statistical analyses suggested that homophilous IGO networks39 
with regard to organizational function are more likely to be successful in settling conflicts as 
compared to heterophilous networks (though the finding is not statistically significant). 
However, IGO networks in Darfur revealed a different pattern and demonstrated that 
collaborations among organizations with different functions would be more effective (than 
homophilous networks) in addressing conflict settlement. The AU and UN are mixed type of 
IGOs (undertaking both civilian and military tasks) and generally undertook the military tasks; 
the Arab League and IGAD (civilian organizations) remained focused on the civilian 
dimensions of the conflict.  
                                                
39 Organizational function homophily scores in Darfur range between 0.44 and 0.5, indicating 
a relatively heterophilous network.  
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  Deployment of IGOs with different organizational functions presumably facilitates the 
division of labor, as the case in Darfur shows. To illustrate, while the AU and UN focused on 
the military aspects of the conflict, such as patrolling the refugee and internally displaced 
people (IDP) camps (Fryer 2013), the Arab League, particularly IGAD, engaged in mediation 
efforts. IGAD’s efforts, though they failed to usher in a comprehensive peace agreement, 
were critical in receiving regional endorsement for the peace process (International Crisis 
Group Report 25 March 2004).  
   In conclusion, what the Darfur case illustrates is that a dense network, including 
regional and sub-regional organizations with an understanding of the culture, the roots of the 
conflict, a vested interest in witnessing the end of the conflict and return to normalcy (De 
Maio 2009); and extra-regional organizations that vindicate the peace process (by showing 
that it is not used an instrument for the assertion of hegemonic control [Paddon 2011]) helps 
the peace process move forward.  
  Additionally, similar to the Bosnian intervention, Darfurian case underscores that 
collaboration among organizations with different organizational functions may be more 
effective in conflict settlement as compared to missions deployed by IGOs with the same 
organizational function as it presumably facilitates complementarity of missions and the 
division of labor.  
Conclusion  
  In this chapter, I presented a novel way of empirically capturing the IGO networks in 
peace operations and examine how their structural properties and composition matter for the 
success of peace missions in accomplishing their core goals. The density of inter-
organizational networks among IGOs appears to be important factors associated with peace 
operations’ performance, as hypothesized. Additionally, composition of IGO networks and 
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particularly having similar organizational functions are associated with the performance of 
peace operations in undertaking violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict 
settlement. Thus these results show how analyzing the structure and composition of IGO 
networks can provide more nuanced theoretical and empirical explanations of the 
performance of peace missions in internal armed conflicts. 
  In contemporary peace operations, the UN is not the sole player in the field. Thus, the 
success and failure of peace missions to a large extent depends on the coordination and 
collaborations among organizations and actors involved. In addition to presenting findings of 
the statistical analyses, I covered three illustrative cases to demonstrate how IGO networks’ 
composition and structural properties accounted for the successes of violence abatement in 
Cote d’Ivoire, conflict containment in Bosnia and conflict settlement in Darfur.  
  These cases demonstrate how IGO networks are formed matters. Although dense 
IGO networks in Bosnia (although not as dense as those in Côte d’Ivoire) were successful in 
containing conflict in the country, organizational function heterophily, rather the 
organizational function homophily, as was the case in Côte d’Ivoire, was instrumental in 
affecting conflict containment success. Similarly, in Darfur, the incongruence in 
organizational function facilitated the division of labor and implementation of the peace 
process. Even though the UN and AU along with IGAD and the Arab League, engaged in 
peace negotiations, the military power (that is not available to civilian organizations, such as 
IGAD) they brought in, promoted the implementation of the peace process by enforcing a 
robust mission.  
  Next chapter provides a summary of this dissertation’s findings, discusses its 
empirical, theoretical and policy implications, and concludes with the directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
  In this study, employing social network analysis, I analyzed the factors that determine 
the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in 
peace operations, and the effect of these collaborations on the success and failure of peace 
missions.  
  This dissertation was comprised of two parts. The first part analyzed the motives for 
IGOs to form inter-organizational partnerships. The second part of this study examined the 
role of IGO networks, their structural properties and composition, in accounting for peace 
operations’ performance in implementing their core goals. 
  In this study, applying the multi-theoretical multi-level (MTML) framework, I put 
forward theory-driven hypotheses to explain the motives for IGOs to collaborate in 
conducting peace operations despite the fact that there are risks, such as losing autonomy, 
and organizational identity; and collective dilemmas, such as free-riding, associated with 
such partnerships.  
  Drawing on theories of resource dependence, social capital, social network analysis, 
e.g., homophily, I tested arguments with regard to the theories on inter-organizational 
collaboration and presented a novel way of capturing the processes that account for the 
formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace 
missions.  
  Furthermore, applying the Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria, this study analyzed 
the role of collaborative relations and the networks that IGOs form in affecting the 
performance of peace operations’ core goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and 
conflict settlement. 
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  This concluding chapter provides a summary of my findings with regard the IGO 
collaborations and their impact on peace operations’ success and failure, and discusses 
empirical and theoretical as well as policy implications of this study. The chapter concludes 
with directions for future research.  
Summary of Findings  
Why Do IGOs Collaborate in Peace Operations? 
  Findings from the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGMs) partially 
supported my hypotheses in terms of the formation and evolution of inter-organizational 
collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace operations and led to important insights 
regarding the role of resource dependence and complementarity in driving such collaborative 
relations. 
  One of the most surprising, but interesting, findings of this study related to the 
measure of prior bad experiences—the bad news effect (Pearson et al. 2013). I 
hypothesized that IGO dyads engaged in operations that were discredited as failures would 
less likely to collaborate in future operations or maintain their partnerships. However, though 
the coefficient was quite small in magnitude, I found a positive coefficient, suggesting that 
organizations would maintain their collaboration notwithstanding bad news, specifically their 
failure in providing the security of peacekeepers. 
  Another surprising finding of this study related to the measure of homophily. Contrary 
to the existing research on homophily that suggests that similarity breeds formation of ties, 
organizational function homophily did not prove to account for the formation IGO 
partnerships in peace missions. However, my findings provided evidence that similar 
organizations with regard to their organizational type are less likely to collaborate.  
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  Quite consistent with this organizational type heterophily finding, and contrary to 
previous research (Cranmer et al. 2012b), I found that distance between IGOs had a positive 
effect in accounting for formation of IGO collaborations. This finding further confirmed the 
theories of resource dependence and exchange by showing that IGOs were more likely to 
team up with the organizations that could provide required capabilities and resources. More 
specifically, organizations would forge relationships with one another on the basis of their 
need for military capabilities, human and financial resources, rather than their proximity, 
since many of them were not capable of carrying out large-scale and robust operations that 
contemporary peace missions entail. 
  Conversely, my results suggested that organizations located in the same 
geographical region were more likely initiate partnerships, providing further support for the 
regionalization of peace operations arguments (Sidhu 2006).  
  This study also provided evidence that once IGOs formed relations, they tend to 
persist their collaborations because these prior ties, even if they may have failed40, would 
breed trust among organizations mitigating the costs of collective action. Prior collaborations 
may, furthermore, facilitate the diffusion of norms, values, and common practices across 
organizations, and presumably provide organizations the opportunity to draw on their 
experience.  
How Do the Characteristics of IGO Networks Account for the Performance of Peace 
Operations?  
  What do logit results and illustrative cases tell us about the role of inter-organizational 
collaborations in peace operations?  
                                                
40 For instance, they may fail in providing the safety of peacekeepers. 
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  The results of the study presented here confirmed my hypotheses that structural 
properties of IGO networks carrying out peace operations matter for the performance of 
these missions. As described in detail in Chapter 5, my findings suggested that peace 
operations conducted by dense IGO networks (as compared to sparse networks) were more 
likely to be successful in reducing violence, containing and settling conflicts. Therefore, the 
main conclusion one can draw from this study is that IGO network density, which entails 
widely inclusive networks, matters for peace operation success with regard to violence 
abatement and conflict settlement. 
  It appears that dense networks that constitute regional, sub-regional and extra-
regional organizations are more likely to enhance the legitimacy of peace operations and 
acquire required resources and capabilities that are often cited as critical elements in 
contributing the success of peace missions. For instance, the relative success of peace 
settlement in Darfur could be attributed to the dense network of collaborations among 
regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations, i.e., the AU, IGAD, the Arab League 
and the UN, as collectively they were able to coerce spoilers to agree on terms of the peace 
agreement. Additionally, these dense networks presumably generated a perception among 
IGOs that “they have a stake in the mission’s performance” (Gelot 2012, 134) and thus, 
should work harder. 
  This study also tested an argument regarding the role of network centralization in 
accounting for peace operations’ performance. In contrast to the previous research on the 
subject, I did not find any statistical evidence suggesting that centralized IGO networks were 
more likely to be successful in undertaking peace operations’ core tasks, even though the 
relationship appeared to be positive as hypothesized.  
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  My hypothesis regarding organizational function homophily stated that peace 
operations conducted by IGOs sharing the same organizational function would be more 
successful. Interestingly, despite the positive relationship between the organizational 
function homophily and success in violence abatement and conflict settlement, 
organizational function homophily coefficient was negative in conflict containment model, 
suggesting a negative relationship. This result may be attributed to the certain tasks that 
conflict containment process entails.  
  Conflict containment dimension of peace operations constitutes two core tasks: 
geographic and actor-based containment of the conflict. In this sense, while civilian 
organizations may be better suited to undertake such roles as preventing the spread of the 
conflict, mixed or military organizations may be better equipped to deal with another aspect 
of the mission, for instance, fighting with spoilers, preventing the import of arms or personnel 
(Diehl and Druckman 2010). Possessing different organizational function, e.g., cultures, may 
also facilitate the division of labor between IGOs and avoid the duplication of efforts.  
  In addition to statistical analyses, this study employed cases studies to illustrate how 
structural properties and composition of IGOs affect the performance of peace operations in 
abating violence, containing and settling conflict, in Cote d’Ivoire, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Bosnia) and Darfur respectively. These illustrative cases provided evidence for the positive 
effect of dense collaborative relations among IGOs in accounting for the performance of 
missions. These findings, therefore, may suggest that fostering inter-organizational 
collaborations among IGOs is critical, as they will enhance the effectiveness of peace 
operations. 
Theoretical and Empirical Implications 
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  Although there is a considerable amount of research on UN’s role in peace 
operations as the primary actor, the research on other peacekeeping actors, such as 
regional and sub-regional organizations, is still limited. By analyzing interactions among 
these entities, this study gives insights into the effect of collaborative relations among IGOs 
in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security, more specially the 
outcomes of peace operations.  
  This dissertation is the first study that applies a social network analysis framework to 
research the collaborative relations among IGOs executing peace operations. In contrast to 
previous studies (Balas 2011a), this study shows that network analysis can be usefully 
utilized to explain inter-organizational collaborations between IGOs in peace operations. 
Network effects, for instance, friend-of-a-friend triadic closure, suggesting that two 
organizations connected to a common organization would be more likely to collaborate, were 
evident in formation and evolution of partnerships among IGOs, African Union (AU) and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partnership in Somalia (they both collaborated 
with the UN) is a case in point. 
  Prior work on peace operations analyzed operational level factors that contribute to 
the success of peace operations through a limited number of personal observations of 
former peacekeeping practitioners and comparisons of only a few missions. Even though the 
study of peace operations benefits from the micro-level analysis, such as the local 
dimensions of the conflict in which peace operations are deployed, “the closer one gets to 
the local specificities of individual peace operations, the easier it may be to lose sight of the 
broader patterns of missions, including how they fit into—and are reflections of—
international political writ” (Paris 2014, 501). Using social network analysis and quantitative 
methods allowed for the evaluation and comparison of a large number of peace operations, 
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and thus, set a foundation for predicting how and why the inter-organizational networks and 
their structural properties account for the success of peace operations.  
  Furthermore, analyzing and comparing the role of inter-organizational interactions in 
conducting peace operations would enlarge studies on organizational learning and practices 
by providing insights on which types of IGO networks and collaborations perform better than 
others, and why. Consequently, this may allow for the design and conduct of more effective 
missions and provide an impetus for repeating the best practices.  
Policy Implications 
  In addition to its theoretical and empirical implications, this study presented here has 
policy implications and provides a variety of lessons for the deployment, planning and 
coordination of future peace operations.  
  Given the complexity of causal factors that drive the success of peace missions, any 
conclusions are limited in scope. With this caveat in mind, this study could shed light on the 
effective practices that can be adopted by IGOs on the ground.  
  Despite the fact that many of the factors affecting the peace operations’ performance 
are indeed beyond the power of peacekeepers and organizations to change, this study 
suggests that peace operations can be conducted and designed in a way to mitigate some of 
the undesirable conditions that these operations encounter. In that sense, “lessons learned” 
efforts could draw on the best practices from the field. 
  This study makes the case that the inclusion of all viable and key IGO actors in which 
the region the conflict takes place may enhance the legitimacy of the collective efforts. To 
illustrate, “as they are of the region, regional organizations bring strong background 
knowledge and existing personal and professional contacts to the process, permitting the 
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ease of access and an ability to exert pressure that may not be available to the UN” 
(Boulden 2003, 1-2). 
  Additionally, dense relations that are formed by these collaborative efforts would help 
operations to pool more resources and required capabilities that one organization is less 
likely to provide. They may also facilitate the division of labor on the ground and help 
organizations to focus on their comparative advantages.  
  Dense networks may enable information exchange and generate trust among IGOs. 
Information exchange and trust would assist organizations to synchronize and harmonize 
their partnerships, prevent conflicting mandates, and duplication of efforts, and thus, would 
help IGOs use their resources and capabilities more effectively.  
  Testing and conceptualizing framework for evaluating and studying IGO 
collaborations can contribute to the institutionalization of these collaborative efforts, as 
opposed to the formation of ad hoc partnerships. Well-designed and institutionalized IGO 
partnerships on the ground may fight against political and economic uncertainty as well. 
Agenda for Future Research 
  Future research may provide a more in depth exploration of IGO dyads and groups to 
determine which organizations “have the potential to cooperate most effectively” (Tavares 
2010, 17) with another, get along and why.  
  In this study, the emphasis is placed on the IGOs. Yet, IGOs are rarely the only 
actors involved in peace processes, and conducting operations on the ground. Addressing 
complex problems and daunting challenges, such as building or rebuilding institutions of war-
ravaged countries, protecting civilians and providing humanitarian assistance amid violence, 
require other actors and partners, including local governments, NGOs, and nation states to 
buy in. Therefore, future research would benefit from examining not only the interactions 
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among IGOs conducting peace operations but also the networks among NGOs and IGO-
NGO collaborative efforts.  
  Moreover, studying collaborations among unilateral operations conducted by states, 
such as French peacekeeping operation, Opération Licorne, deployed in Côte d’Ivoire, and 
IGOs, and their impact on peace operations’ effectiveness is a potential research project that 
scholars could tackle with.  
  This study did not analyze the role of IGO collaborations operating in conflicts 
between states, i.e., interstate conflicts. Future research might apply this study’s framework 
to the conflicts between states. This will, in turn, provide a further test for the generalizability 
of the findings of this study. 
  Furthermore, future research may benefit from a more in-depth exploration of 
collaborative peacekeeping efforts by collecting more network data via interviews with IGO 
officials. This practice would serve as another major test for the generalizability of current 
studies’ findings as well. 
  Another issue to be taken into consideration by the research community is to adopt a 
different coding scheme for measuring peace operations’ success, such as providing a more 
precise differentiation between success measures, i.e., including a partial success coding. 
  A more nuanced conflict containment coding differentiating between actor wise and 
geographical conflict containment also has merit. Even though some operations may fail in 
preventing the spread of the conflict, they may become successful in reducing or limiting the 
number of warring factions. Thus, despite being judged as successful missions with regard 
to actor-based conflict containment, they may be considered failed operations in preventing 
the spread of conflict to neighboring countries, or within the host country. Therefore, different 
assessments and a more nuance coding scheme (coding success in actor-based conflict 
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containment and geographical containment separately) may provide a better understanding 
of the factors that contribute to success in conflict containment.  
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APPENDIX 
The List Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) 
African Union 
Arab League  
Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
Caribbean Community 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
Collective Security Treaty Organization 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Community of Portuguese Language Countries  
Economic Community of Central African States 
Economic Community of West African States 
European Union 
Gulf Cooperation Council  
Intergovernmental Authority on Development  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Organization of American States 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
Shanghai Cooperation Council 
South African Development Community 
United Nations  
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 Notwithstanding the growing consensus on benefits associated with collaborations 
among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in peace operations, academic research has 
thus far neglected pressing questions of why and how IGOs collaborate within a network 
context in peace operations and how these inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs, 
IGO networks, might account for the success/failure of these operations. This dissertation 
concentrates on how composition and structural properties of IGO networks, such as the 
extensiveness of ties between network partners, and the cohesiveness of such networks, 
may account for peace operations’ performance in accomplishing their core goals: violence 
abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement (Diehl and Druckman 2010).  
  This study uses a newly collected relational dataset of inter-organizational 
collaborations among IGOs in peace operations deployed in internal armed conflicts and 
covers the period between 1990 to 2013 to assess and examine the determinants of 
collaboration among IGOs engaged in peace operations and the role of these collaborations, 
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and their structural characteristics, in performance of peace missions. My hypotheses are 
tested using inferential network analysis and logit models to capture the effect of inter-
organizational networks on peace operations’ outcomes. 
        Drawing on a multidisciplinary framework bringing together insights from international 
relations, social network analysis and organizational studies, this study found that dense and 
cohesive IGO networks, will have a moderating effect on network effectiveness. Specifically, 
higher density of IGO networks is associated with successful outcomes in abating violence 
and settling conflicts. 
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